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PREFACE
Hie ethical drug industry has received considerable
attention both from academic researchers and government
investigators.

A focal point for this interest is the

industry's high rate of return relative to other manu¬
facturing industries.

In spite of this extensive cover¬

age, studies of the industry's return on investment have
ignored important economic and financial variables.

Con¬

sequently, this study considers the effects of certain
previously suggested variables on return on investment in
general and on the ethical drug industry's rate in par¬
ticular.
Hie goal of this study, then, is to add to our
knowledge regarding rate of return and its determinants.
It is not the intent here either to criticize or defend
the drug industry regarding rate of return or any other
matter.

Whether an industry's return on investment is

excessive can only be decided with reference to normative
Judgements by social and political decision-makers.
Hie writer's interest in the drug industry results
from exposure to prior research conducted by Professor
Alexander Barges.

An acknowledgement of gratitude is

due to Professor Barges and to Professors James B.
Ludtke, H. Richard Hartzler, and Donald G. Frederick, all

iv

of the University of Massachusetts, for their help in
producing this study.

Professors Willard T. Carleton

and Thoxnas Warren of Dartmouth College were most helpful
in the acquisition of data from the Compustat Tape,

The

use of the computer facilities at Nichols College is
gratefully acknowledged.

Two colleagues at Nichols

College, Professors James L, Conrad, Jr,, and Kenneth M.
Parzych read the manuscript and offered many helpful
comments.

The responsibility for errors in the final

result remains my own.

My wife, Carolyn, provided

encouragement and support throughout the project.
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The ethical drug industry has been under continuous
study by governmental investigators and academic researchers
for some time.

The focal point of many of these studies is

the industry’s relatively high rate of return on investment
(ROI).

High rates are often cited as an indication, if not

proof, of noncompetitive behavior.

However, there is

little agreement regarding the definition of ROI, the
determinants of ROI, and the proper method for making inter¬
industry ROI comparisons.

Ihese issues are examined and a

model is developed to study the ethical drug industry’s
return on investment.
Regression techniques are utilized to test the invest¬
ment and structural characteristics as potential determinants
of ROI.

The hypothesized association with ROI is supported

for the two risk measures and for growth in demand but
rejected for the concentration ratio, average company size,
and R&D intensity.
The three measures of investment characteristics are
combined into a cross-sectional, multiple regression equation
giving a model of ROI which is used to study the drug

2

Industry's rate of return.

Data for the industry are intro¬

duced into the model to obtain a forecast of rate of return
with variance, skewness, and growth held constant.

Com¬

paring the forecast with the observed rate shows observed
ethical drug Industry average KOI to be below the rate that
could result given the particular set of investment charac¬
teristics exhibited by the drug industry sample.

Therefore,

the hypothesis is accepted that ethical drug industry
average ROI is the same as a11-manufacturing Industries
average ROI after consideration of Investment characteristics.
There are several possible explanations for why this
model can explain statistically drug industry ROI:

First,

data are utilized only for firms primarily engaged in the
manufacture of ethical drug products rather than data for
both ethical and proprietary drug firms.

Second, more

recent data may reflect changed economic relationships,
both within the drug industry and between the drug and other
industries.

Third, the model formulated includes more

variables than prior models.

Fourth, explicit considera¬

tion is made of possible statistical errors in both the
regression equation and in the ROI forecast.

V
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CHAPTER

I

THE ETHICAL DRUG INDUSTRY
The ethical drug industry is composed of firms whose
main source of revenue is the sale of prescription drugs.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to designate a company as
belonging strictly to the ethical drug industry because
most drug companies manufacture nonprescription, pro¬
prietary drugs as well as ethical drug products.

This

problem is met by selecting firms from the ethical drug
classification on Standard and Poor’s Coinpus tat Tape.

To

be included in this classification, a firm must have pre¬
scription drugs as its primary source of revenue.*
For some time considerable attention has been focused
on the ethical drug industry’s high rate of return relative
2
to that of other manufacturing industries.
The results of
earlier analyses by federal agencies and nongovernmental
*For a list of the firms included in the ethical drug
sample, see Appendix II. No data are available regarding
what percentage of ethical drug companies’ revenues come
from ethical drugs and what percentage is derived from other
products.
It is unlikely that ethical drugs account for less
than 60 to 65 percent of the revenues of the firms sampled.
2

See Chapter VI and Appendix II for graphical and
statistical comparisons of ROI for the ethical drug industry
and for the a11-manufacturing industries samples.

2

sources confirm this relatively high return, but there
remain varying opinions regarding the contributing factors
involved.

This study seeks to identify and test statis¬

tically measurable variables that on logical grounds could
conceivably explain industry rate of return.

Industry Characteristics

Much of the attention received by the ethical drug
industry results from its unique characteristics.

Atten¬

tion has been focused in particular on relatively high
return on investment, intensive promotional and research
activity, and inelastic demand.
Considerable potential for monopolistic behavior,
which can result in high rates of return,

is created by the

importance of health to the individual and by the nature of
the channels of drug distribution.

The ethical pharma¬

ceutical industry is not subject to the usual consumer con¬
trol, for once a drug is prescribed, the individual auto¬
matically purchases it.^

As health is involved, price is

generally of little importance in the purchase of prescrip¬
tion drugs, and therefore, the industry faces a condition
of relative price inelasticity.
^Demand elasticity for drugs is discussed in Mickey C.
Smith, Principles of Pharmaceutical Marketing (Philadelphia:
Lea and ^ebiger, 1971)•

3

Similarly, the industry is characterized by income
inelasticity evidenced by the fact that drug purchases are
about equal for low- and high-income groups.

As shown in

Table 1, mean gross drug expenditures range from $30 for
families with incomes below $2000 to $52 for those having
over $7500 incomes.

This small range is in contrast to the

range of $165 to $4.11 in gross health expenditures per
family.
Attempts to control the ethical drug industry are
helped by the relative inelasticity of demand for pharma¬
ceutical products.

Competition based on price is supplanted

by product differentiation and high promotional expenditures,
both of which are characteristics of noncompetitive indus¬
tries.
Intensive promotional efforts aimed at physicians
contribute to the industry*s control over product promotion
and distribution.^"

As the consumer is not directly involved

in the selection of a drug, the manufacturer must convince
only the prescribing physician that its brand-name product
is the best for a particular disease or condition.
physicians are readily identified,

Since

they are easily contacted

by pharmaceutical firms through salesmen, direct mail, and

^For a
products are
Smith, eds..
and Wilkins,

detailed description of the way pharmaceutical
marketed, see Bernard G. Keller and Mickey C.
Pharmaceutical Marketing (Baltimore:
Williams
1969).
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advertising in medical journals.

The intensity of these

promotional efforts is indicated by the drug industry’s
high rank in inter-industry comparisons of advertising and
promotional intensity.
Another unique characteristic of the ethical drug
industry is its relatively high outlays for research and
development

(RAD) activity.

Table 2 shows that the industry

allocates RAD expense at the rate of J+.5 to 5.6 percent of
sales in contrast to an a11-manufacturing average of 1.9 to
2.0 percent.

Such intense research activity in conjunction

with the patent privilege can give existing pharmaceutical
manufacturers a significant advantage over potential entrants
into the drug industry.

As research can be a barrier to

competitive entry, high RAD intensity may provide a non¬
competitive advantage that can be exploited to gain a
high rate of return.^
While various structural characteristics are often
cited as indications that the ethical drug industry is not
competitive, relatively high rate of return on investment
is commonly used as a summary measure for monopolistic
^For example, see Jules Backman, Advertising and Com¬
petition (New York:
NYU Press, 1967).
There is additional
discussion of advertising and promotion in Chapter IV.
^Research and development intensity is discussed in
detail in Chapter IV.

6

TABLE 2
INDUSTRY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INTENSITY41

Percent
Industry

Food and Kindred Products
Textiles and Apparel
Paper and Allied Products
Industrial Chemicals
Petroleum—Refining and Extracting
Rubber Products
Stone, Clay, and Glass Products
Primary Metals
Fabricated Metal Products
Machinery
Electrical Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Aircraft and Missiles
Professional & Scientific Instruments

w

l%4

b

b

0.4
0.4

0.4

0.4

0.8
4.1

0.7
4.2

1.2
1.6
1.6

1.0
1.0
1.6

0.7
1.4
3.1
3.6
2.5

0.7
1.3
3-2
3.6

0.7

2.6

z'}

2.6

2.5

0.7
3.9
0.9
1.7

1.6
1.2
3.1
3.6
3-4

kii

All-Manufacturing Industries— Mean

1.9

2.0

2.0

Ethical and Proprietary Drugs

4.5

5.6

5.4

aR&D expense as a percent of net sales.
Company
outlays only; government outlays not included.
^Not available.
Source:

U.S., National Science Foundation, Basic Research,
Applied Research and Development in Industry, 1969
(Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office,
1970), p. 81.

7

behavior.^

It is the industry’s high return on investment

along with high research outlays,

intensive promotional

activity, inelastic demand, and other indications of a
noncompetitive situation that has led to the many investiga¬
tions and studies.
Studies of the Industry

The first extensive review of the ethical drug in¬
dustry was initiated in 1959 when the Senate Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly, with Estes Kefauver as Chairman,
o

investigated the monopolistic aspects of the industry.
These hearings were wide-ranging and covered such topics as
differential prices of brand-name and generic-name drugs,
the role of patents, the comparison of foreign and U.S.

?For example, see U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee
on Monopoly, Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry,
statement submitted by Willard F. kueller (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 1807-1861; and Estes
Kefauver, In a Few Hands--Monopoly Power in America
(Baltimore:
Penguin, 1965).
®U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly, Administered Prices in the Drug Industry
(Washington, D.dJ.:
Government Printing Office, I960).
The following are discussions of the hearings:
Richard
Harris, The Real Voice (New York:
Macmillan, I96I4.) ;
Kefauver, in a ffew Hands; and William S. Comanor, ”The
Drug Industry and Medical Research:
Ihe Economics of the
Kefauver Committee Investigations,” Journal of Business
(January, 1966), pp. 12-18.

8

Q

prices, and extensive promotional activity.7

Concluding

that the anti-competitive aspects of the industry required
attention, the Kefauver Committee recommended corrective
legislation designed to force the lowering of drug prices
and industry rate of return.10

The resulting Kefauver-

Harris Act, passed in 1962, basically followed the Com¬
mittee^ proposals, although a key provision requiring
compulsory patent licensing was omitted.

However, the

legislation failed to bring about any appreciable decline
in the drug industry* s rate of return.
This failure to reduce return on investment resulted
in another major set of hearings by Senator Gaylord Nelson*s
Subcommittee on Monopoly.

The main recommendations by

^As different brand-name drugs may closely resemble
one another as regards chemical composition, they are grouped
together under a common or generic name.
This generic name,
of course, is not the possession of any company and is not
patentable•
10The following were identified by the Committee as
being indicative of lack of competition:
monopoly pricing
under patents, lower foreign prices for identical products,
identical prices for different companies’ products, and
high ROI.
The Committee's recommendations were that use of
generic-name drugs be encouraged, that the existence of side
effects be included in advertising, that there be compulsory
patent licensing after three years, and that the Food and
Drug Administration be given increased regulatory powers.
^See Chapter VI and Appendix II for graphical and
statistical evidence of the trend of drug industry ROI from
1963 to 1971.
12

Hie hearings which were conducted from 1967 through
1972 were compiled in U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee
on Monopoly, Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry
(Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1967-1972).

9

witnesses critical of the industry were to encourage the
use of generic-name drugs and to restrict the patent priv¬
ilege.

As the hearings were only recently concluded, no

corrective legislation has been passed as yet.
Unfortunately, investigation of the drug industry has
been complicated by political overtones, which is under¬
standable given the importance of health to individuals
and to society.

An academic researcher who is generally

critical of the drug industry observed:
The hearings constitute an interesting and often
fascinating contribution to the literature of politics,
but are here and there notably incomplete as an exer¬
cise in applied economic analysis.
In part this is due
to the periodic interference of moral indignation when
giving and taking testimony, for the issues investigated
were highly controversial. . . .^3
Additional studies have resulted from the publicity
generated by the Senate hearings.

In general,

the focus has

been on the structural and investment characteristics of the
industry and on how these characteristics are associated with
the industry*s high return on investment.1^

For example.

Professor Seymour Harris of Harvard asks.
^%enry B. Steele, ”Patent Restriction and Price Com¬
petition in the Ethical Drugs Industry,” Journal of Industrial
Economics (July, 1964), p. 198.
■^Structural characteristics refer to the way the
industry is organized, particularly in regard to concentra¬
tion and barriers to competitive entry.
Investment charac¬
teristics are the distinctive features of an investment,
such as risk and growth in demand, that capital suppliers
assess when evaluating a project's expected rate of return.

10

Is it appropriate that a public-utility industry should
be subject to such large areas of monopoly, . . .
unusually high profits ...» and yet be free of any
substantial regulation of monopoly practices?1^
Harris, like Kefauver, favors modification of the patent
laws and the dampening of demand for brand-name ethical
drugs with the hope of reducing prices and rates of return.
The effects of patents and promotional activity on
drug industry return on investment have been extensively
studied by Professor Henry Steele of the University of
Houston.
correct ”,

He recommends uncompromising legislation to
.

. misallocation of resources in excessive

selling efforts, duplicative research and product develop¬
ment programs, and exceptionally high profit levels.
„16
•

•

#

In an empirical study, the probable effects of several
commonly suggested policy changes are assessed by Hugh
Walker.

17

His conclusion is that the net social benefits

"^Seymour E. Harris, The Economics of American
Medicine (New York:
Macmillan, 1964), p. 99.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Monopoly,
Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, statement sub¬
mitted by Henry £. Steele, p. 197(5.
Professor Steele, who
has a Ph.D. in Industrial Economics from MIT has done much
research in the areas of medical economics and drug industry
regulation.
■^Hugh D. Walker, Market Power and Price Levels in the
Ethical Drug Industry (Bloomington, In.:
Indiana University
Press, 197lT«
Walker is currently Visiting Professor of
Economics at the University of Toronto.
The empirical work
was the basis for a Ph.D. dissertation completed by the
author at Vanderbilt University in 1967*

11

would be small from 1) removal of drug brand-names;
2) removal of drug patents; or 3) removal of both.
Investment characteristics such as risk and growth in
demand have been emphasized in other studies of the drug
industry.

An example is the attempt by Gordon Conrad and

Irving Plotkin of the A. D. Little Company to measure the
1 ft

risk premium in rate of return. °

Using regression tech¬

niques to hold risk constant, they compare drug industry
and average all-manufacturing rates of return.

Although

the drug industry is found to be relatively risky, the
risk variable does not explain the excess of the industry’s
rate of return over that of the a11-manufacturing sample.
Growth in demand is considered as a determinant of
drug industry return on investment by Alexander Barges and
Brian Hickey.

19

In attempting to explain statistically

the industry's relatively high rate of return, the authors
find growth in demand to be a significant determinant.

How¬

ever, using a growth variable, they are able to explain only
about one-third of the difference between drug industry and
lfi

Gordon R. Conrad and Irving H. Plotkin, "Risk/Return:
U.S. Industry Pattern,” Harvard Business Review (March-April,
1968), pp. 90-99.
This article is discussed in more detail
in Chapter III.
^Alexander Barges and Brian R. Hickey, "Drug Industry
Profits," Financial Analysts Journal (May-June, 19o8),
pp. 75*83*
When the article was written, the authors were,
respectively, Associate Professor of Finance and Faculty
Research Assistant at the University of Massachusetts.
See
Chapter III for additional discussion of this study.

12

average a11-manufacturing rates of return.
Prior studies have not satisfactorily explained ethical
/

drug industry rate of return, because either determinants of
return on investment were ignored or no more than one or two
determinants were considered simultaneously.

In particular,

investment and structural characteristics have not been con¬
sidered jointly in any single significant research.
The purpose of this study is to develop a model that
can be used to study the ethical drug industry's rate of
return on investment.

To do this requires:

1) the evalua¬

tion and empirical testing of variables associated with rate
of return including risk, growth, concentration, company
size, R&D intensity, and promotional intensity; 2) the
assembly of these determinants into a model of return;
3) the use of the model in an attempt to explain statis¬
tically the drug industry's rate of return.

No attempt will

be made to determine whether or not drug industry returns
are excessive, since this can only be normatively estab¬
lished with reference to social and economic values.
By providing additional understanding of return on
investment and its determinants,

this study will aid social

and political decision-makers in making judgements regarding
whether a particular industry should be more closely
PC)

These determinants are defined as those measurable
investment and structural characteristics that are contrib¬
uting factors to explaining rate of return.

13

regulated.

This increased understanding should be par¬

ticularly useful in reference to the drug industry, which
is characterized by ongoing controversy regarding its
relatively high rate of return.

CHAPTER

II

RETURN ON INVESTMENT
Return on investment is a widely used measure of how
well capital suppliers are rewarded for the use of their
resources.1

To calculate return on investment (ROI), a

profit figure is divided by the amount of capital invested:

ROI = PROFIT/INVESTMENT

The resulting figure can be ambiguous since different com¬
monly used definitions for both profit and investment produce varying measurements for rate of return.

2

One Interpretive ambiguity is the profit variable
which appears In the numerator of the ROI fraction.
income before taxes eliminates the effects of taxes.

Using
In¬

come before financial costs reflects return without the
influence of leverage

(financial risk).

Income after taxes

^For example, ROI is used as a means of inter-industry
comparisons in Aerospace Research Center, Aerospace Profits
Vs♦ Risks (Washington, D.C.:
Aerospace Industries Assoelation of America, 1971); and in George J. Stigler, Capital
and Rates of Return in Manufacturing Industries (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963).

2

It is not proper to combine just any profit or income
figure with just any investment figure.
The logic of
accounting conventions produces relationships between par¬
ticular income and investment accounts.
Examples of such
logical pairings are net operating income with total
operating assets and net income after taxes with stock¬
holders' equity.

15

is affected by both tax law and leverage.

Other definitions

of profit similarly have unique interpretations.
/

The definition of the capital base is also a source of
ambiguity for ROI since different figures have different
interpretations as to the efficiency of an investment.
contribute further to the interpretive complexity,

To

the in¬

vestment figures are balance sheet items and can be measured
at the beginning-of-the-year, end-of-the-year, or the two
can be averaged.^
Differences in depreciation practice also affect return
on investment.

Assuming the use of net fixed assets, depre¬

ciation expense is a current deduction from income which is
offset by an equal reduction in capital invested.

As the

depreciation schedule is not necessarily the same as the
rate of wearing out or obsolescence of assets, depreciation
deductions can distort the relation between accounting in¬
come and economic rate of return.

A study by Thomas Stauffer

concludes that accounting rate of return

(after depreciation)

is a poor measure for economic rate of return.^

Another

^Por a discussion of the possible effects of using
beginning- or end-of-the-year figures along with a numerical
example, see Alexander Barges and Brian R. Hickey, ”Drug
Industry Profits,” Financial Analysts Journal (May-June,
1968), p. 80.
^•Thomas R. Stauffer, ”The Measurement of Corporate Rates
of Return:
A Generalized Formulation,” The Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science (Autumn, 1971), pp. 434--4&9.
fhe profit figure used to calculate economic rate of return
would reflect a depreciation deduction just sufficient to
replace the capital used up in generating revenue during the
profit period.
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study presents evidence that,
... in long-run equilibrium the forces of competition
tend to equalize "cash returns" rather than "accounting
returns."
The rate-of-return calculation which excludes
depreciation deductions approximates the "cash rate of
return on gross assets."5
The question of which ROI measure is most appropriate
for use in comparisons of return on investment is unresolved
with different researchers arriving at conflicting conclu¬
sions.

Marshall Hall and Leonard Weiss argue for the use

of return after taxes divided by stockholders’

equity because

they believe that capital structure is an integral part of
the mix of inputs.^

They conclude that different capital

structures produce different rates of return on assets even
in competitive equilibrium, and therefore, rates of return
on equity, not return on total assets, would be expected to
be equalized.^
Return on equity is rejected in another study because

q
the measure does not consider the debt-to-equity ratio.

^Barges and Hickey,

"Drug Industry Profits," p. 82.

^Marshall Hall and Leonard Weiss, "Firm Size and
Profitability," Review of Economics and Statistics (August,
1967), pp. 319-3TH
"^Return after taxes to stockholders' equity is used
also in I. N. Fisher and G. R. Hall, "Risk and Corporate
Plates of Return," Quarterly Journal of Economics (February,
1969
pp. 79 92
However, no explicit rationale is given.

),

- .

8
Risks.

Aerospace Research Center, Aerospace Profits Vs.
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Return on total assets is used instead to eliminate financial
risk as a variable and to focus on business risk.

q

As out¬

lined above, similar reasoning regarding leverage by Hall
and Weiss leads them to prefer the return on equity measure.
In an extensive study of rates of return in manufac¬
turing industries, George Stigler used income after taxes
plus interest divided by total assets, arguing that rate of
return on equity ignores debt capital suppliers’ attitudes
1C
about risk and return. v

Stigler conceded that the decision

to use return on total assets is made in the face of many
unanswered questions regarding the influence of capital
structure on ROI.
With no apparent agreement on what constitutes the
best definition of return on investment for inter-industry
comparisons,

the choice of a measure is up to each individual

researcher’s judgement and rationale for his particular study.
The definition used in this research is net income after
taxes divided by net worth.11
^Business risk is the uncertainty or variability of
return inherent in an economic undertaking.
■^Stigler, Capital and Rates of Return.
llfrhe rationale for the choice of net income after
taxes divided by net worth is presented in Chapter V.
In
Chapter VI, the possible effects of different capital struc¬
tures are considered by including the debt ratio as an inde¬
pendent variable and by introducing return on total assets
into the regression model.
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Relation to Capital Supply

There are well established concepts regarding the rewards
that go to those who supply resources for the productive
process.

The total reward flow from an economic undertaking

is divided into wages, rent,

interest, and profit, with

profit as a balancing item.

Profit,

therefore,

is a

residual and can range from a negative amount to a positive
figure well above normal.

12

The flow of money capital from surplus spenders
spend less than their incomes)

to deficit spenders

(who

(who

spend more than their incomes) varies considerably over time
in response to political, social, and economic variables,
with expected rate of return being particularly important.
To induce investment in a given project, capital suppliers
require a minimum rate of return which is determined by
pure interest plus a premium associated with any undesirable
investment characteristics inherent in the project.
12

To the accountant, profit is
after subtracting out costs.
To the
profit is the reward to the supplier
is, therefore, a cost.
Return above
called pure or excess profit.

11

This

the revenue remaining
economist, a normal
of equity capital and
the normal level is

13
^For a discussion of required rate of return, see
William F. Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices:
A Theory of Market
Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk," Journal of Finance
(September, 19614.), pp. 425-I4I42; Lawrence F’isher, ,rDe terminants of Risk Premiums on Corporate Bonds," Journal of
Political Economy (June, 1959), pp. 217-237; and Donald S.
Watson, Price Theory and Its Uses (New York:
Houghton
Mifflin, 1963), Chapter 5.
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required rate of return has at least three identifiable
levels:

The first level is a minimum rate established by

administrative costs, time preference, or liquidity pref¬
erence below which investors will not supply any capital.
The second level is determined by opportunity costs as
rational investors will not commit capital to a project
that offers a lower ROI than an alternative project with
the same investment characteristics.

The third level is

the maximum rate obtainable from any project with a given
set of investment characteristics.
The first level of required rate of return is estab¬
lished by investors' attitudes regarding capital invest¬
ment, but the second and third levels are based on indivi¬
dual companies'

financial results.

Although capital sup¬

pliers receive their return as interest, dividends, or
capital gains with their preferences determined by the tax
structure and brokerage costs, the fact remains that the
reward for contributing capital ultimately comes from the
profitability of the firm.
Normal Rate of Return

The theory of pure competition includes the proposition
that rate of return regulates investment to produce the most
efficient allocation of capital.

If there is insufficient

investment to meet consumer demand, prices are expected to
be bid up which increases ROI and attracts additional capital.
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Eventually, according to the theory, prices decline or costs
increase until rate of return is again at the normal level
/

with no excess profit.
Based on the theory of a normal rate of return,

some

economists believe the existence of an apparently stable ROI
above the normal or average can result only from monopolistic
behavior.^

These economists assume that the most likely

explanation for relatively high industry rate of return is
that existing firms have blocked competitive entry, and
therefore,

stable, above-average rates are proof of a non¬

competitive situation.

An above average ROI may, of course,

result from industry structural characteristics which can
be barriers to entry themselves without any anti-competitive
behavior on the part of existing firms.

For example, high

capital or technological requirements for efficient produc¬
tion can prohibit competitive entry.
Hie veracity of attributing above-average rates of
return to a lack of competition has been questioned.

For

instance, Stigler asks:
What is the nature of the proposition that under
competition there is a tendency for rates of return
on investments in various industries to approach
equality?
It has been taken by some economists as a
definition of competition; persistently high profits

lf+For an example of this viewpoint, see U.S., Congress,
Senate, Subcommittee on Monopoly, Competitive Problems in the
Drug Industry, statement submitted by Willard F. Mueller —
(Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1968),
pp. 1806-1861.
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in an industry would be proof that the industry is not
competitive.
But this usage is one-sided:
no one
would argue that the existence of the average rate of
return in an industry proved that the industry is
competitive.15
A competitive but high-risk industry might have a higher
than average rate of return as compensation for above average
risks.

A noncompetitive industry may exhibit a below average

ROI because of changes in product demand to which it is dif¬
ficult to adapt.

This has been explained by Stanley

Ornstein as follows:
The pure theory of competition and monopoly does
not provide a basis for the traditional hypothesis
that with few rivals a firm will earn above average
profits.
Unanticipated changes in demand and cost or
high risk industries may lead to above average profits
in competitive industries and result in differential
returns both within and between high and low concentra¬
tion industries. . . . Hence, above average returns
may persist in competitive industries for long periods
of time given sufficient disequilibrium, or a monopoly
may experience below average profits for long periods
depending on demand and cost conditions.
Pure competition is, of course, an extreme or limiting
case.

A study relating economic concepts to basic social

processes explains:
"Monopolistic competition" can be read simply as
impure competition - that is, competition that fails to
correspond in every detail with the hypothetical ideal
of the theory of pure competition.
Thus conceived, it
[monopolistic competition] is the competition of any
real-world economy.17
^Stigler, Capital and Rates of Return, p. 55*
•^Stanley i. Ornstein, "Concentration and Profits,"
Journal of Business (October, 1972), pp. 519-520.
"^Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblora, Politics,
Economics and Welfare (New York:
Harper and Row"] 1953) •
p. £01.

22

Inter-Industry Comparisons

When inter-industry ROI comparisons are made, industries
are grouped by their stage in the productive cycle

(e.g.,

manufacturing or retailing) or by the nature of the product
(e.g,, consumer or producer good) or by some other variable.
This is done on the assumption that these industry groups
hold constant such characteristics as risk, growth rate in
demand, elasticity of demand, or other variables that can
affect ROI.

A comparison of rates of return for small

grocery stores and for large banks, for instance, would be
meaningless because the two groups are too dissimilar.
Therefore, ROI comparisons are made within broad industry
groups; e.g., comparing a manufacturing industry with an
all-manufacturing industries average.
The use of industry groups assumes that all the in¬
dustries in a group have similar characteristics.

This

assumption is difficult to accept as the industries in a
modern technological economy have diverse investment and
structural characteristics.
The assumption of similar investment and structural
characteristics can be avoided by using a model that ex¬
plicitly considers these rate of return determinants.
Industry structure can be held constant by using the wellknown market models. °
1 ft

However, these structural models

The four basic models are pure competition, monop¬
olistic competition, oligopoly, and pure monopoly.
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do not solve the problem of comparability for several
reasons.

First, there are only four main categories for

industry structure.

This dictates that all but the most

obvious differences between industries must be ignored
since an industry can be placed into only one of the basic
models even though the industry may have characteristics
associated with several of the models.

19

Second, the

structural models make no allowance for investment charac¬
teristics which can affect rates of return.
Inter-industry comparisons of return on investment
have been complicated by several problems.

First, there

is no agreement regarding the proper definition of ROI to
utilize for such comparisons.

Second,

some economists

have interpreted the propositions of competitive theory
in such a manner as to equate relatively high rates of
return with anti-competitive behavior.

Third, the basic

market models have been used to hold structural charac¬
teristics constant but these models ignore fine differences
in characteristics since there are only four basic models.
Also, structural models do not allow consideration of
investment characteristics.

What is needed is a model of

ROI which explicitly considers the determinants of ROI as
19
7For example, an industry may have a large number of
small firms, a characteristic of monopolistic competition,
but a few of the largest firms may dominate the market as
in oligopoly.
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measured by both investment and structural characteristics.
An alternative means of making inter-industry com¬
parisons of return is to use the investment and structural
characteristics in a multiple regression model.

For example,

an equation with ROI as the dependent variable and risk as
an independent variable would allow comparisons of rates of
return with risk held constant.

Other investment and struc¬

tural characteristics can be explicitly considered in the
same equation.
A multiple regression model of ROI that explicitly
considers investment and structural characteristics is
presented in Chapter V.

Prior to that, the characteristics

including risk and growth in addition to concentration,
research intensity, company size, and advertising intensity
are discussed in the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER

III

INVESTMENT CHARACTERISTICS

The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature
pertaining to the influence of selected investment charac¬
teristics on ROI in order to provide a foundation for con¬
struction of a return on investment model.

Primary emphasis

is placed on risk and growth in demand inasmuch as these
variables are associated with premium rates of return, even
in competitive industries.

The discussion of the influence

of institutional or structural characteristics on ROI is
deferred to Chapter IV.^
Risk Premium
The association of risk and rate of return is widely
accepted but poorly understood because the definition and
measurement of risk are ambiguous.

Verification of the

risk/return relationship is difficult since risk is a sub¬
jective consideration, and consequently, researchers have
had to use surrogate variables to measure risk.

The one

common element in the perception of risk is lack of pre¬
dictability regarding the return to be expected from an

^The precise definitions for the variables used in
the ROI model are explained in Chapter V.
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Investment, and therefore, risk is defined as variability
of return on investment.

p

/

In the money markets risk and return are considered
together, and certainly, this is one reason why common stocks
are expected to have a higher yield than bonds.

3

Bonds are

generally less risky than stocks because bonds receive in¬
terest before dividends are paid, and in liquidation debt
capital is returned first.

Walter Hickman examined the

risk/return relationship as it affects the securities markets
and confirmed the traditional assumption of a positive asso¬
ciation between risk and rate of return.^
To lessen the complexity of the risk/return relation¬
ship, researchers commonly utilize several simplifying
assumptions.

The first concerns the difficulty of observing

investors’ perceived expectations after the fact.

Given a

sufficient number of observations, it is assumed that the
observed results are, on the average,
expected by the investors.

the same as the results

Therefore, researchers use

p

No distinction is made in this study between risk and
uncertainty.
-^Mean rate of return from stocks was found to be sub¬
stantially higher than average return from bonds in Lawrence
Fisher and Roman L. Weil, "Coping with the Risk of InterestRate Fluctuations,” Journal of Business (October, 1971)>
pp. ij.08-431.

4

Walter B. Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality and Investor
Experience (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 19^5).
£

■^This assumption is explained in detail in Paul H.
Cootner and Daniel M. Holland, "Risk and Rate of Return,"
(Cambridge, Ma.: MIT DST Project #95&5> 1964).
(Mimeo¬
graphed.)
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ex post information to assess ex ante risk.
A second simplifying assumption is that investors have
diminishing marginal utility for income or wealth.

6

Since

diminishing marginal utility implies risk aversion, an
investor is assumed to accept additional risk only if it is
coupled with increased return and if the return is increased
in more than a one-to-one ratio with risk.

In other words,

the investor values the dollar of investment which he stands
7
to lose more than the dollar of return he hopes to gain.'
Variability of return as a measure of risk.

It is

generally accepted that there is a positive association be¬
tween rate of return and uncertainty about the receipt of
return, but an acceptable means of measuring the risk
premium has been elusive.

Explaining their procedure in

the development of a risk measure,

Paul Cootner and Daniel

Holland state:
Risk is basically a subjective phenomenon, and not
susceptible to direct measurement.
What we have done
therefore, is by purely deductive reasoning estab¬
lished that certain other, objectively measurable
concepts are related to risk.
Our next step is, by
For an extensive discussion of the subject of utility
of income, see Milton Friedman and Leonard Savage, ’’The
Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk,” Journal of
Political Economy (August, 1948), pp. 279-304*
7
Two references that discuss investor risk aversion
are Richard A. Brealey, An Introduction to Risk and Return
from Common Stocks (Cambridge, Ma.:
MIT Press, 1969),
pp. 47“£4; and Paul H. Cootner and Daniel M. Holland, "Rate
of Return and Business Risk,” The Bell Journal of Economics
and Management Science (Autumn, 197^)* pp. 2ll-226.

28

statistical techniques, to correlate rate of return
with these objective measures.”
They utilized the standard deviation of individual company
ROI’s around the industry mean for the measurement of
variability of return (risk).^

Regression analysis pro¬

duced a statistically significant positive association
between rate of return and the standard deviation and thus
confirmed the hypothesis that dispersion of company ROI is
a determinant of return on investment.
The relationship between return on investment and
variability of return is depicted by the two hypothetical
distributions of ROI in Figure 1.

Measured by the variance

or standard deviation, dispersion of company rates of re¬
turn for industry A is relatively small, while for industry
B, dispersion is much larger.

Similarly, uncertainty re¬

garding occurrence of a given rate of return is much greater
for industry B than for A.

For B the risk of a negative

rate of return is very real possibility, but for A, the
risk of such a capital loss is negligible.

A risk-averse

investor would demand a higher rate of return from an invest¬
ment in industry B because of the greater uncertainty
o

°Cootner and Holland,

"Risk and Rate of Return," p. 31.

^For a discussion of various descriptive measures of
the probability distribution of rates of return, see
Appendix I.
There has been much research into the question
of the total risk associated with a portfolio of investments
as opposed to the risk associated with the investments them¬
selves.
Such studies are commonly referred to as covariance
models•
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associated with this investment.
There are two separate methods for measuring variability
of return:
tion.

inter-spatial variation and inter-temporal varia¬

Inter-spatial variation is found by calculating varia¬

bility of individual company rates of return around their
industry mean.

Inter-temporal variation is the variability

of company rate of return around its own mean over time.
The inter-temporal method is a measure of the volatility
of an individual company’s ROI.

Stated alternatively,

the

inter-temporal measure indicates the extent to which company
rate of return is affected by cyclical changes in the economy.
To the extent that cyclical changes can be predicted, temporal
variation in ROI can be predicted.

If a firm’s future rate

of return can be predicted with any reasonable degree of
accuracy, the fact that the predictions vary considerably
over time does not mean that investment in the firm is un¬
certain or risky.

Reliance on inter-temporal variability

can be criticized also on the basis that economic time series
tend to be autocorrelated, and therefore, the measure is
unsatisfactory as a risk measure.^
Inter-spatial variability of return measures the
volatility of individual company rates around the average
■^This problem is emphasized in U.S., Congress, Senate,
Subcommittee on Monopoly, Competitive Problems in the Drug
Industry, statement submitted by Gordon R. Conrad and Irving
ti. ploikin (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office,
1968), pp. 1714-6-17814..
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for the industry, and is, therefore, an industry rather
than a company measure.^

Differences in inter-spatial

variability between industries could result from such sources
as:
1.

Differences in the ease of entry into an industry

or ease of adding to productive capacity.
2.

Differences in income elasticity of demand for

the industry’s output which would affect response to general
economic activity.
3.

Differences in price flexibility.

!(..

Differences in raw material supply stability.

5.

Differences in storability and durability of raw

materials and finished goods.
6.

Differences in exposure to foreign competition.

7.

Differences in competition among existing products.

Ihe unique set of these and other characteristics defines
the risk environment for an industry.
The following characterization of how the investor
may perceive risk demonstrates inter-spatial variability
of return as a risk measure:

A capital supplier can invest

in an industry by either setting up a new firm or by pro¬
viding capital to a going concern for asset expansion,
product development, or other projects.

Being reasonably

^This conceptualization closely follows that in
Conrad and Plotkin’s testimony.
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experienced, the investor assumes he can pick investments
as well as anyone else which implies he at times will be
particularly astute and at times will make errors.

The

investor might well judge the risk inherent in investing
in the industry by the past impact upon ROI of errors and
astute decisions experienced by firms in the industry.

If

the impact on ROI has been extreme as evidenced by high
inter-spatial dispersion, risk would be judged high.

If

it appeared unlikely that a decision-making error would
push ROI far from the industry mean, risk would be assumed
negligible.
Concluding that inter-spatial variation is superior
to the inter-temporal measure, Conrad and Plotkin summarized
their rationale as follows:
Researchers who have concentrated on temporal
measures of riskiness have generally found them
unsatisfactory both theoretically and empirically.
The inability of these measures to ’’explain" rates
of return we attributed to the fact that they con¬
founded predictable with nonpredictable changes.
It is our feeling that the interspatial risk measure
better captures the all-important nonpredictable
element.32
Inter-spatial variability is,

therefore, a summary

measure that indicates the risk environment of an industry.
In order to attract capital, a firm in a high-risk environ¬
ment must offer a compensatory high rate of return relative
1P

Gordon R. Conrad and Irving H. Plotkin, "Risk/
Return:
U.S. Industry Pattern," Harvard Business Review
(March-April, 1968), Supplement.
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to that available from firms in lower-risk environments.
The measure, of course, is applicable to investments in
individual companies and not to balanced portfolios con¬
taining investments in many firms from a given industry.
Hie inter-spatial measure can, however, indicate high
risk even though there is considerable stability in in¬
dividual company rates of return.
for example,

This would be the case,

if some firms in an industry have consistently

high rates of return while others have consistently low
rates.

For the measure to be valid, then, both individual

company rates of return and relative company rankings must
vary over time.^
Researchers have utilized both the inter-temporal
and the inter-spatial measures of risk.

For example,

Cootner and Holland included both measures as variables in
a multiple regression equation and found the two risk
variables to be highly collinear.^

Their preference for

the inter-spatial measure was based on the assumption that
investors find it costly to diversify within, as opposed to
between, industries, and therefore, rates of return for in¬
dustries with particularly high inter-spatial variation must
include a risk premium as compensation for such costs.
^3gy studying temporal variation of ROI along with
rank-order correlation coefficients, Conrad and Plotkin con¬
cluded that both individual company returns and relative
rank do vary over time.
See Conrad and Plotkin, "Risk/
Re turn."
■^Cootner and Holland, "Rate of Return and Business Risk."
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Inter-temporal as well as inter-spatial variation
were used in a study by Fisher and Ha 11.Although both
measures were statistically significant explanatory vari¬
ables for ROI, the authors adopted the temporal variable
on logical grounds.

Their basic argument was that temporal

variation reflects risk in general terms as the uncertainty
of predicting a company’s future rate of return.

However,

as pointed out above, variation over time may be relatively
predictable and therefore not at all uncertain.
In the Conrad and Plotkin study cited above,

the

arguments regarding the proper measure for use in inter¬
industry risk/return comparisons were reviewed.1^

When

they statistically tested the inter-spatial and inter¬
temporal measures, the former was found to have a signif¬
icant positive association with ROI, while the latter was
significant but had a negative coefficient which was con¬
trary to their hypothesis.
Inasmuch as the goal in this study is to develop a
measure that adequately reflects subjective investment risk
for use in inter-industry comparisons of rate of return,

it

does appear from the review of the literature that the better

^1. N. Fisher and G. R. Hall, "Risk and Corporate
Rates of Return,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (February,
1969), pp. 79-92.
■^Conrad and Plotkin,

’’Risk/Return."
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choice is inter-spatial variation.

The rationale is much

like the one put forward by Conrad and Plotkin.

First, the

/

inter-spatial measure seems to reflect better the nonpredictable element of investment which is presumably central
to investors’ perceptions of risk.

In contrast, the inter¬

temporal measure appears to reflect the extent to which
cyclical change affects a particular firm.

The state of the

art in forecasting cyclical change provides a basis for
predicting the future movement of company ROI around its
own mean.

17

Second, inter-spatial variation is a true industry
variable rather than an average of company variables.
though investments are made in companies,

Al¬

it is argued that

industry statistics strongly influence choice of investment.
The assumption is that investors have limited time and re¬
sources for acquiring investment information, and conse¬
quently, they rely heavily on industry statistics.
The Conrad and Plotkin study referred to earlier is
an example of the use of inter-spatial dispersion to explain
industry rate of return.

Using data for 1950-1965 from the

Compustat Tape, the authors tested the hypothesis ”...
that industries characterized by highly dispersed profit
■^The investor has considerable choice among the variety
of forecasting techniques and models; nevertheless, he is
probably able to predict future business conditions for an
industry more accurately than to predict individual company
rates of return.
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distributions are judged by management and investors to be
riskier than those characterized by compact distributions
of profit rates.”

1A

With ROI defined as average return

after taxes on total permanent capitalization, the risk/
return association was positive and significant, and there¬
fore, the hypothesis was accepted.

Some of Conrad and

Plotkin’s results are shown in Table 3«

It is interesting

to note in this table that the drug industry has the highest
variance and second highest ROI.
In the course of Senate hearings on the drug industry,
Conrad and Plotkin’s study was criticized by Willard Mueller.
In his testimony, Mueller claimed:

"The preponderance of

economic evidence argues that the persistently high profits
of the drug industry are the result of the absence of
effective price competition in the sale of many products.
He concluded that inter-spatial variation of ROI is actually
a measure of relative market power:
Because of advertising and other factors, some firms
in such [differentiated product] industries have a
pronounced and persistent advantage over others.
As
a result, the most advantaged firms earn persistently
higher profits than the less advantaged firms.
Such
a difference between the profits of the most advantaged
and least advantaged firms in an industry may provide
^Conrad and Plotkin,

” Risk/Re turn. "

^%.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Monopoly,
Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, statement sub¬
mitted by Willard F. Mueller (Washington, D.C.:
Govern¬
ment Printing Office, 1968), p. 1827.
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TABLE 3
RETURN ON INVESTMENT AND VARIANCE
1950-1965

Industry

Variance6

R0Ib

Cosmetics
Aerospace
Radio and TV Manufacturers
Bldg. Mat. - Heating, A/C, & Plumbing
Electrical Products
Machinery Manufacturers
Beverages - Brewers
Electronic Products
Chemicals and Chemical Products
Shoe Manufacturers
Machinery - Metal Fabricating
Copper Producers
Office and Business Equipment
Building Materials - Cement
Textiles
Oil - Integrated Producers
Steel Producers
Containers - Metal and Glass
Aluminum Producers

67.281*.

18.7

59.901
57.631
34-965
27.I4.86
27.1*26
25.1*12
22.822
21.306
20.535
19.580
19.528
14.170
8.708
8.477
7.494
5.014
3.709
^•579

12.2
15.0

8.1
L*8

All-Manufacturing Industries Average

23.8i^.

10.8

Drugs - Ethical and Proprietary

74.213

17.5

8.8
11.0
10.1
9.8

13.0
12.1
8.7
9.0
9.5
12.5
11.7
7.5

10.6

8.5

aVariance in percent squared units.
^ROI (percent) - Average rate of return after taxes
on total permanent capitalization (book value).
Source:

Gordon R. Conrad and Irving H. Plotkin, ”Risk/
Return:
U.S. Industry Pattern,” Harvard Business
Review (March-April, I960), p. 94-
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a rough measure of the height of the entry barriers
into the industry.20
To back up his claims, Mueller presented a restructuring of
Conrad and Plotkin’s industry sample by separating consumer
and producer goods industries.

As a result of the re¬

structuring, the risk/return relationship became very weak
and not statistically significant for the producer goods
industries which Mueller believes are more homogeneous.
Hie strong positive association between variance and ROI
remained for the consumer goods sample.
Conrad and Plotkin consider this criticism in depth
in an unpublished rebuttal to Mueller’s testimony.^2
Regarding the claim that inter-spatial variation really
reflects the height of barriers to entry,

they argue that

the measure has been successfully used in stock market
studies.

23

The measure,

in their opinion, cannot be inter¬

preted as measuring barriers to entry in the securities
markets since all industries are equally easy to enter by
PO

Ibid., p. 1835.

21

As can be seen in Table 3* Conrad and Plotkin mix
consumer and producer goods industries in their sample.
PP

Irving H. Plotkin and Gordon R. Conrad, ’’Rebuttal
to Testimony Given by Dr. Willard F. Mueller, Director,
Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Before the
Monopoly Subcommittee of the Select Committee on Small
Business, United States Senate, Washington, D.C. - January
18, 1968,” p. 2.
(Typewritten.)
^For example, see Brealey, An Introduction to Risk;
and Lawrence Fisher and James H. Lorie, "Some Studies of*
Variability of Return on Investments in Common Stocks,”
Journal of Business (April, 1970), pp. 99-13I+.

39

the purchase of stocks and bonds.
As to Mueller’s restructuring of the industries to
provide a more homogeneous sample, Conrad and Plotkin say:
... it is not necessary that all industries in any
regression service the same sector of the economy for example, producer goods or consumer goods.
Nor
is it necessary that all industries in the regression
be purely competitive industries.
Nor is there any
basis for requiring product homogeneity within the
industries.
The only homogeneity requirement is that
they represent realistic alternative possibilities
for capital investment. . . .
One of the objects of this study was to isolate
evidence of non-competitive returns.
It is, accord¬
ingly futile and without theoretical basis to require
that all industries studied be purely competitive.^4
Two further quotations help to characterize Conrad
and Plotkin’s views.
It was not our object to establish the drug
industry as being uniquely risky, and we make no such
claim.
We merely make the claim that the capital
allocation process in our economy is one which demands
higher prospective rates of return for projects which
it considers more risky.
. • . The condemnations implicit in listing
industrial endeavors from highest to lowest profit
without regard for risk variations are without
economic justification.^5
Stigler empirically studies the view, expressed by
Mueller, that competitive industries will exhibit a smaller
dispersion of average rates of return than noncompetitive
industries

For the time period 1938-194.7* he finds that

“^Plotkin and Conrad, ’’Rebuttal to Mueller,” p. 11.
25lbld.. pp. 17-18.

26

George J. Stigler, Capital and Rates of Return in
Manufacturing Industries (Princeton:
Princeton University
Press, 1963), pp. 69-70.
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the variance of concentrated industries is significantly
greater than that for unconcentrated industries, but using
a second period, 1947“1954» there is no significant dif¬
ference between the two variances.

These ambiguous results

are further confused by the fact that the concentrated and
unconcentrated samples exhibit no significant differences
in rates of return.

The results do not confirm the hypo¬

thesis that concentrated industries have greater dispersion
in ROI.
A major study commissioned by the Bank Administration
Institute deals in depth with the problem of risk measure¬
ment.

In brief, the study concludes:

Almost every writer, however, believes that risk is
associated with uncertainty or unpredictability.
Therefore, when talking about the riskiness of
securities or other assets, it seems reasonable to
assert that their riskiness is related to uncertainty
regarding their rates of return in the future.
In
addition, it seems reasonable to believe that ex ante
uncertainty is related to ex post variability "In rates
of return.
For those reasons, most studies of the
relationship between risk and rate of return are
studies of the relationship between some measure of
variability in rates of return and average rates of
return .27
Another risk/return study emphasizes the problem of
^Bank Administration Institute, Measuring the
Investment Performance of Pension Funds fPark Ridge, Ill.:
The Institute, 1968), p. 29.

management's discretion in accounting treatment.

p ft

The

authors, Robert Litzenberger and Cherukuri Rao, discuss the
possibility that some firms can lessen the magnitude of
unanticipated swings in earnings by smoothing reported
income.^

The study found a statistically significant

association between variation of return and ROI.
There have been a number of studies critical of the
use of variation in return to measure risk.

For example,

the Mueller testimony discussed above is notable.3®

Another

case in point is a study by Jon Joyce and Robert Vogel who
demonstrate empirically that variance under some conditions
produces conflicting rankings as regards risk.
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None of

these critical studies has been sufficiently persuasive
or conclusive to eliminate variation of return as the most
widely used measure for risk.
Skewness as a measure of risk.

There is considerable

evidence to suggest the inclusion of higher order moments
than mean and variance in describing distributions of ROI.
2®Robert H. Litzenberger and Cherukuri U. Rao, "Esti¬
mates of the Marginal Rate of Time Preference and Average
Risk Aversion of Investors in Electric Utility Shares, 19601966," The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science
(Spring, 1971), pp. 265-277.
2Q

7For a discussion of this topic, see Richard H. Simpson
"An Empirical Study of Possible Income Manipulation," ^count¬
ing Review (October, 1969), pp. 806-817.
3^U.S., Congress, Senate, Competitive Problems in the
Drug Industry, pp. 1807-1961.
Jon Joyce and Robert Vogely "The Uncertainty in Risk:
Is Variance Unambiguous?" Journal of Finance (March, 1970),
pp. 127-1314..
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Use of the mean-variance approach depends on at least one
of the following conditions being met:

1)

that the dis¬

tribution of ROI can be adequately described by a twoparameter family distribution such as the normal or
Gaussian; or 2) that investors consider only mean and
12
variance in making decisions under certainty.^-

Not¬

withstanding the widespread use of the mean-variance
framework, there have been a number of studies which
demonstrate both conceptually and empirically the
implausibility of these conditions.33

Therefore, it seems

reasonable to examine the measure of the third moment,
skewness, as a possible determinant of rate of return.

To

reduce the complexity of the discussion, it is assumed in
this section that variance is held constant, or in other
words, skewness is considered as a variable for a given
degree of variance.
The concept of skewness is depicted in Figure 2 which
shows three hypothetical distributions, each with the same
mean, but different skewness.

The first is a symmetrical

distribution showing the same frequency of occurrence of
3^For a discussion of the distribution of ROI, see
James Tobin, "Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk,"
Review of Economic Studies (February, 1958)> pp. 65-86.

33

For example, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Essays in the
Theory of Risk-Bearing (Chicago:
Markham, 1971)> and S. C.
Tsiang^ ,rlhe Rationale of the Mean-Standard Deviation
Analysis, Skewness Preference, and the Demand for Money,"
American Economic Review (June, 1972), pp. 354*371.

Frequency
of
Occurrenee

Fig. 2.--Symmetrical and skewed distributions
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rates of return above the mean as below the mean.

The

second distribution is positively skewed with a high fre¬
quency of occurrence of rates of return below the mean
and a low frequency of rates above the mean.

Very high

rates of return do occur but relatively infrequently.
The third graph shows negative skewness where rates of
return above the mean occur with high frequency and rates
below with low frequency.

As shown in graph C, the prob¬

ability of a large negative rate of return (a capital loss)
is considerably greater in the negatively skewed distribu¬
tion .
The commonly hypothesized negative relationship be¬
tween ROI and skewness results from emphasizing the small
chances of a large capital loss or a high rate of return
as depicted by the tails of the skewed distributions.
Researchers have posited that risk-averse investors demand
a risk premium to offset the small chance of a large capital
loss and that investors will accept lower average rates of
return in order to gain the small chance of a relatively
high ROI.

Such behavior is often described as resulting

from a lottery effect whereby the investor prefers positive
asymmetric distributions

(like a lottery) and dislikes

negatively skewed distributions.-^

^"Lotteries and insurance are discussed in Friedman
and Savage, ’’The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving
Risk.”

In a frequently cited article regarding the effects
of asymmetric distributions, Fred Arditti hypothesized a
negative association between ROI and skewness. ^

He

tested skewness as a determinant of ROI in a simple regres¬
sion model using data for firms listed in Standard and
Poor* 8 Composite Index for the period 1914-6-1963.

Although

the regression coefficient for skewness was significant,
its sign was positive, not negative as predicted.

When

skewness was included in a multiple regression with
variance and other independent variables, the skewness
variable was significant and had the hypothesized negative
sign.
To study skewness as a determinant of ROI, Jeffrey
Jarrett added a skewness variable to a previously developed
model which related rate of return to the coefficient of
variation.

While he did not perform any statistical

35pred D. Arditti, ’’Risk and the Required Return on
Equity,” Journal of Finance (March, 1967), pp. 19-36.
When discussing the sign o;f the skewness/ROI relationship,
there is a potential for confusion.
Preference for positive
skewness and dislike of negative skewness implies that in¬
vestors expect a higher ROI in compensation for accepting
negative skewness and that investors will accept a lower
ROI in exchange for positive skewness.
Therefore, a negative
association between ROI and skewness is predicted.
^ Jeffrey Jarrett, ”A Note on Earnings Risk and the
Coefficient of Variation:
Comment,” Journal of Finance
(December, 1970), pp. 1159-1160.
The original model is
from Richard P. Brief and Joel Owen, "A Note on Earnings
Risk and the Coefficient of Variation,” Journal of Finance
(December, 1969), pp. 901-9014..

1+6
tests on the added variable, Jarrett did show that when
skewness is included, quite different predicted rates of
return result.
Skewness was included as a variable in the Fisher and
Hall study discussed above.

17

The authors hypothesized that

skewness would have a negative sign implying negative skewr

ness is associated with high rates of return.

However,

in

a footnote which demonstrates the relationship in equation
form, they explained that it is unclear whether the co¬
efficient of the skewness variable is positive or negative.
Their empirical results showed the coefficient of skewness
to be negative but significant only at the 10 percent level.
Although not offering any rationale, Cootner and
Holland implicitly accept the negative association between
ROI and skewness.In their multiple regression model
which includes other risk measures, the coefficient of
skewness was significant at the 1 percent level, but its
sign was positive.

The authors explain that this result

may indicate no relation exists between ROI and skewness,
but they also acknowledge the possibility of a conceptual
error in the specification of the skewness variable.
Using an entirely different line of approach, Clayton

37pisher and Hall, "Risk and Corporate Rates of
Return."
3®Cootner and Holland,
Risk.

n

"Rate of Return and Business
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Alderfer and Harold Bierraan conducted an experiment to teat
the effects of skewness on the investor.

For subjects,

they used business school graduate students and company
middle managers who were asked to choose between investments
with similar means and variances but different skewness.
Itie graduate students showed a strong preference for invest¬
ments with high positive skewness but no chance of loss
and completely avoided an investment with high negative
skewness and some chance of a large loss.

The business

managers also showed a preference for the positively skewed
investment; however, II4. percent of the sample of managers
did choose the investment with high negative skewness and
some chance of a large loss.

The different behavior by

the two groups may be explainable by a higher degree of
risk-aversion on the part of the students.

These results

lend some support to the negative ROI/skewness hypothesis,
but no firm conclusion is possible, because skewness, even
coupled with variance, was insufficient to explain the
choices made.
Understanding of the effects of skewness on rate of
return has been considerably advanced by several recent
studies which developed and tested three-moment capital

39dayton Alderfer and Harold Bierman, Jr., "Choices
with Risk; Beyond the Mean and Variance,” Journal of Busi¬
ness (July, 1970)» pp. 341-353*

4fl
asset pricing models.^

In an unpublished article, Alan

Kraus and Robert Litzenberger derived such a three-parameter
model by incorporating a measure of systematic
fiable)

(nondiversi-

skewness into the mean-variance framework.^1

To

justify their hypothesis of a negative association between
skewness and rate of return,

the authors emphasized the

argument that investors have non-increasing absolute riskaversion (i.e., risk assets are not inferior goods) which
implies preference for positive skewness.^

Using securities

market data, Kraus and Litzenberger tested the effects of
skewness on ROI and found the risk variable to be significant
and to have the expected sign.
The assumption regarding non-increasing absolute riskaversion was tested experimentally by Gordon, Paradis, and
i;3
Rorke.
In a portfolio game, participants with different

^These are basically portfolio models, and therefore,
the variable definitions and data are somewhat different
from those used in this study.
However, the basic assumptions
regarding the risk/return relationship are comparable.
^Alan Kraus and Robert H. Litzenberger, "Skewness
Preference and the Valuation of Risk Assets," December, 1972.
(Mimeographed.)
^The sign
Arrow, Essays in
and the Required
Rationale of the

of the skewness variable is discussed in
the Theory of Risk-Bearing; Arditti, "Risk
Return on EquityM; and S. C. Tsiang, "The
Mean-Standard Deviation Analysis."

^3m. j. Gordon, G. E. Paradis, and C. H. Rorke,
"Etxperimental Evidence on Alternative Portfolio Decision
Rules," American Economic Review (March, 1972), pp. 107-

.
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wealth levels made consumption and investment decisions.
The decision-makers' behavior was compatible with the con¬
dition of decreasing absolute risk-aversion.
Another three-parameter model has been formulated by
Blaine Huntsman who predicted a negative association between
ROI and skewness based on the "... normative and empir¬
ically appealing condition of decreasing absolute risk
aversion.

.

.

.

To test the model, Huntsman used finan¬

cial and share price data stratified into four industry
groups:

electrical utilities, machinery, chemicals, and

building materials.

Skewness was found to be not statis¬

tically significant; however, this result can be explained
on the basis of high correlation between the skewness and
variance measures.
Despite the continued use of the two-moment, meanvariance framework, there is considerable theoretical and
empirical evidence that skewness has an important effect
on rate of return.

Taken as a whole, the research reviewed

above provides strong support for the hypothesis of a
negative association between skewness and ROI.
Other measures of risk.

There has been some research

utilizing other ways of measuring risk.
deals with securities market prices,

One measure, which

is based on the

^■Blaine Huntsman, "Natural Behavior Toward Risk and
the Question of Value Determination," Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis (March, 1973)> P• 33&•

50

assumption that investors reveal their subjective assessment
of risk by their willingness to invest in a company at a
given earnings-price ratio.

An empirical study by Ferry

Allen relates company earnings-price ratios to rates of
return on investment in common stock and finds no apparent
relationship between ROI and business risk as measured by
the earnings-price ratio.

U-5

Another risk measure deals with asset turnover, an
activity ratio.

Robert Mayer explains the rationale:

Generally speaking, the larger the proportion of fixed
assets - whose value is extracted by the firm's opera¬
tion only over a long period of years - the less the
activity of the total.
Any factor, internal or ex¬
ternal, giving rise to expectation of an increase in
the proportion of fixed assets thus tends to reduce
the firm's prospective business productivity, i.e., to
increase the business risk.W>
However, Mayer offers no empirical research to support his
ideas.
Asset turnover as a risk measure is empirically tested
by Alexander Barges.

He correlates the total industry sales

to total industry assets ratio with industry profit margins
which provides an indirect comparison between risk and rate
of return.

The author concludes that "... the realized

rates of return were higher for the low-turnover, high-risk
^Ferry B. Allen, "The Measurement of Risk," Financial
Analysts Journal (March-April, I960), pp. 63-70.
^Robert W. Mayer, "Analysis of Internal Risk in the
Individual Firm," Hie Analysts Journal (November, 1959),
p. 92.
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industries than for the high-turnover, low-risk industries.
This association was, however, not statistically significant.
Empirical work to date does not provide the foundation neces¬
sary to warrant the inclusion of asset turnover as a measure
of risk in this study.
Conclusion.

It is generally accepted that capital sup¬

pliers expect to be compensated both for the time value of
money they invest and for the risk inherent in a particular
project.

A major problem in utilizing the idea of additional

return to compensate for risk has been the measurement of the
risk premium.

Different measures have been suggested such as

historical variation of return, skewness of the distribution
of ROI, price-earnings ratio, and asset turnover.^®

Each of

these measures has one or more shortcomings, and no researcher
has claimed that any one of them accurately measures subjec¬
tive risk.

Logical reasoning coupled with the empirical

studies outlined above lead to the conclusion that the best
available measures of risk for use in inter-indsutry com¬
parisons of ROI are inter-spatial variance and skewness of
return on investment.
^Alexander Barges, "Forecasting Returns from Indus¬
trial Investments," in Readings in Financial Management,
ed. by Raymond G. SchulTz (2ded .; Scranton, Pa.:
International, 1970), p. 70.
^See Appendix I for a discussion of such other
measures of risk as semi-variance and standard deviation.

52

Growth in Demand

Growth is often cited as being closely related to rate
of return, but there is disagreement regarding the definition
and measurement of the variable.

This has led to confusion

regarding the effects of growth on ROI regardless of how it
is defined.

Growth has come to symbolize success and

efficiency in business management, and therefore, growth
is linked with the higher rates of return associated with
successful firms.

The relation between growth, be it of

assets or sales or another measure, and ROI can be empiri¬
cally verified.

However, such empirical work requires some

framework for explaining the association.
That so little agreed upon theory about growth has
been developed seems especially surprising in light of the
importance growth apparently has for most businessmen.
Listening to businessmen talk and reading the financial
press, one would almost believe that growth is the central
goal of most companies.

William Baumol says, "I believe

that to him [the businessman] sales have become an end in
ii.9
and of themselves."^
An important difficulty in developing ideas pertaining
to growth is that the concept means different things to dif¬
ferent people.

In its current usage, the term may apply to

^William J. Baumol, Business Behavior, Value and
Growth (New York:
Macmillan, 1959), p. I4.6.
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growth in earnings, growth of stock prices, growth in sales,
expansion of assets, and increases in other measures of
corporate dimensions.
Those who view growth as a type of risk usually
emphasize rate of change in some measure of assets.
Adherents of this concept state that growth,
. . . increases the firm’s profit opportunities, but
also places it [the firm] in a more risky position.
In general, the higher the rate of real investment per
period . . ., the more vulnerable are firms to un¬
favorable contingencies.^
Baumol links growth and risk,

saying,

”... growth is what

strains the firm’s entrepreneurial resources and adds to
the company’s risks.

.

.

. n5l

Viewing growth as a form of risk implies the hypo¬
thesis that growth and ROI are positively related.

If

growth is measured by rate of increase in assets, espe¬
cially fixed assets, the concept is much like the turnover
measure of risk outlined above.

Assuming the perception of

risk mostly results from unpredictability of future returns,
variability of ex post ROI is used as a measure of risk.
Growth can contribute to this variability and therefore may
be a determinant of risk.

As a measure of risk, however.

^ Charles R. Whittlesey, Arthur M. Freedman, and
Edward S. Herman, Money and Banking: Analysis and Policy
(2d ed.; New York:
Macmillan, 196o), p. 320.
^William J. Baumol, ’’Communication:
On the Theory
of Expansion of the Firm,” American Economic Review (Decem¬
ber, 1962), p. 1080.
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variability of return is directly related to risk whereas
growth is indirectly related through the variability measure.
Another theoretical framework for studying growth is
built on the concept of capital as a basic resource.

Since

production requires the combining of these factors, growth
in demand is fulfilled by increasing the quantity of the
factors used.

The resulting increase in demand for pro¬

ductive resources leads to rising resource costs,
cluding capital costs.

in¬

Since demand for capital is derived

from product demand, capital demand increases as product
demand increases.

Different industries, of course, face

different rates of product demand increases and therefore
have different rates of capital demand growth.
The determinants of the rate of change in product
demand and the determinants of the rate of growth in capital
supply are for the most part independent, capital supply
being a function of U.S. and international saving.

This

leads to differential growth rates for the two functions.
Firms with rapidly growing product demand may find their
needs for capital growing more rapidly than the increase in
capital supply.

In order to increase their share of avail¬

able capital, the rapidly growing firms will have to bid up
the price of capital (ROI) to meet their needs.

This leads

to the expectation that growth in demand will be positively
related to rate of return.
An underlying assumption, of course, is that the
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supply of capital is less than perfectly elastic.

Eli

Schwartz, who disagrees with this assumption, believes that
the problem of corporate growth is not financial, that the
cash throw-off of the corporate sector of the economy is
more than enough to finance growth, and that the supply of
capital is relatively elastic.
situation.
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Baumol sees a different

Noting that the sources of capital will not

ordinarily supply unlimited amounts of capital to any
single firm, he believes a company is usually well aware
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of an upper limit of available money capital. J

It may be

that capital is relatively elastic for corporations in
general but not for individual firms or industries.
Even if total capital supply is perfectly elastic,
firms experiencing rapidly growing demand may find investors
requiring a growth premium.

If on the average, the capital

requirements of firms in an industry are growing more
rapidly than capital supply,

their capital needs can be

met only by an increase in the proportion of investors1
portfolios allocated to the industry.

This undesired in¬

crease in portfolio concentration may cause investors to
expect additional compensation in the form of a growth
premium.

In an industry where some firms are growing while

others face declining demand, investors can switch capital
52e11 Schwartz, "Note on a Theory of Firm Growth,"
Journal of Business (January, 1965), pp. 29-33*
^Baumol, Business Behavior, pp. 34-35*
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from on© firm to another in the industry and thereby not
disturb their portfolio balance.
Some earlier studies have distinguished between
growth in demand resulting from general economic expansion
and growth created by the development of new products.
Ezra Soloman sees growth, as opposed to only expansion, as
resulting from the ability of the firm to find and exploit
opportunities to invest in products and projects that will
increase ROI.^

Peter Bernstein believes that, ’’The ability

to create its own market is the strategic, the dominating
and single most distinguishing characteristic of a true
growth company.”^
While the distinction between growth and expansion
may be appealing as a call for innovative managerial effort,
it does not provide much insight into the relationship be¬
tween growth and rate of return.

With present accounting

data there is no way growth and expansion can be separated
empirically,

short of defining growth as increases in ROI.

Expansion would then be reflected as increases in absolute
size; e.g., assets; which are not accompanied by increases
in rate of return.

Defining growth in this way does nothing

^Ezra Soloman, The Theory of Financial Management
(New York:
Columbia University Press, 1^63).
Peter L. Bernstein, "Growth Companies Vs. Growth
Stocks," Harvard Business Review (September-October, 195&)>
p. 89.

to advance understanding of the determinants of ROI.
As noted above, there is no generally accepted ana¬
lytical framework for the study of firm growth.

Despite

this lack of agreement, most authors posit a positive rela¬
tionship between growth in demand and rate of return.

This

is an empirically verifiable relationship.
In a series of articles regarding the effects on ROI
of differential growth rates,

Barges distinguishes between

growth and the concept of risk.

The first study was

primarily concerned with establishing a theory and empir¬
ically testing turnover as a measure of risk as discussed
above, but the initial test of the turnover hypothesis was
not as predicted.

Recognizing the importance of demand

in determining ROI and considering the dynamic nature of
demand. Barges used multiple regression techniques to hold
the dynamic demand variable

(growth) constant.

Adding this

independent variable had the result of showing a positive
association between turnover and ROI, but the equation was
not statistically significant.

In a summary the author

says:
The analysis of rates of return which was presented
indicated that long-term growth in demand exerts a
strong influence on the average rates of return realized
by industries.
This finding, of course, is not sur¬
prising, but it does serve to emphasize the point that
growth rate must be given explicit consideration in any

56
«
^ Barges,
Investments.”

’’Forecasting Returns from Industrial
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empirical analysis and in any realistic forecast of
rates of re turn. 57
In the second article, an attempt was made to fill the
void of empirical research into the rate of return/rate of
growth relationshipRegression analysis was utilized
with average rate of return on assets as the dependent
variable and average growth rate of demand as the indepen¬
dent variable.

A positive association was found that was

highly significant statistically.

The author concludes

that despite substantial variation in growth rate, growth
in product demand is a significant factor in rate of return
for firms and industries.
The third article used the growth variable to explain
C? Q

a specific industry’s rate of return.^7

Following a review

of the hypothesized effect of growth on capital supply, drug
industry average rate of return was predicted using the
average annual rate of change in demand.

The article re¬

ports finding a growth premium of 3.9 percentage points over
the average for a11-manufacturing industries of 12.9 percent.
Taken together, these empirical studies provide considerable
basis for acceptance of a positive association between growth
57ibld.. p.

70.

poAlexander Barges, "Growth Rates and Debt Capacity,"
Financial Analysts Journal (January-February, 1968), pp. 100-

ToITBarges and Hickey, "Drug Industry Profits."
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in demand and ROI.
In a study emphasizing industry concentration, Ornstein
included a growth in demand variable.^

Defining return on

investment as net income after taxes divided by net worth,
the author found a highly significant association between
ROI and growth in demand.
Another study, by William Leonard, attempted to
ascertain the effects of growth and research activity on
rate of

return.^

When growth rate of sales was correlated

with return (after taxes) on stockholders’ equity, a strong
association resulted (r = .75)*
Like most unresolved issues,

the relationship between

ROI and growth in demand is characterized by conflicting
and contradictory ideas and empirical findings.

One view

outlined above places growth and risk in the same category
in their roles as determinants of ROI.

This aspect of

growth would be expected to lead to uncertainty as to
receipt of future financial returns and would therefore
be captured in the variability of return measure of risk.
Another idea, defining growth as only resulting from
acceptance of projects giving a higher than average rate
of return, does little to guide empirical research.

For

^Stanley I. Ornstein, "Concentration and Profits,"
Journal of Business (October, 1972), pp. 519-541.
^William N. Leonard, "Research and Development in
Industrial Growth," Journal of Political Economy (MarchApril, 1971), pp* 232-25&.
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one thing, there is no way of distinguishing growth from
expansion using available published financial data.

A

third concept of the association between ROI and growth
assumes different growth rates for capital demand and
capital supply.

It is argued that investors expect a

growth premium as compensation for increasing their port¬
folio concentration when supplying capital to rapidly
growing firms in an industry.

Although some of the under¬

lying assumptions about capital supply are debatable, this
latter framework seems to be the most acceptable.
Although the concept of growth is still being debated,
the expectation of a positive relation between growth in
demand and return on investment is generally accepted.
This is an empirically verifiable hypothesis, and in fact,
several studies have led to acceptance of this positive
association.

There is ample evidence to justify the in¬

clusion of a growth variable in the ROI model since to
ignore growth would be to leave out a potentially useful
explanatory concept.

Summary

In this chapter, two measures of risk as well as
growth in demand have been discussed in their roles as
investment characteristics that determine return on invest¬
ment.

The basic argument is that industries characterized

61

by relatively high inter-spatial variance of ROI, positive
skewness in the distribution of return, or relatively rapid
growth in demand for the companies’ products, must offer
compensatory rate of return premiums to attract capital.
The next chapter discusses a set of industry structural
characteristics which along with investment characteristics
may affect rate of return on investment.
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CHAPTER

IV

STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
Industry structural characteristics are commonly used
to explain above average rates of return.1

Market struc¬

ture analysis is used in recognition of the proposition that
above average return on investment will attract new firms
into a competitive industry with the ultimate effect of
driving ROI down to the normal level.

In other words, an

above average rate of return should occur only for short
periods in competitive industries.

In noncompetitive theory

firms are assumed to have some control over the market and
consequently to have the potential of maintaining artifi¬
cially high rates of return.

Many believe firms exercise

this potential as a matter of course, but there is no
agreement on whether firms do indeed behave in such a
manner.

2

Equally, the mode of such firm behavior may not

always be readily identifiable.
^For a recent summary of the subject of industry
structure as it relates to performance, see John M. Vernon,
Market Structure and Industrial Performance (Boston, Allyn,
to-

2

For a critical analysis of the extensive use of con¬
centration ratios as indications of monopoly power, see
Yale Brozen, "Significance of Profit Data for Antitrust
Policy," Antitrust Bulletin (Spring, 1969), pp. 119-139.
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Because of the difficulties involved in attempting
to measure differences in behavior, market structure
analysis usually relates structural characteristics directly
to rate of return.

Joe Bain, who has done extensive market

structure research, asserts that:
. . . market conduct cannot be fully enough measured
to permit us to establish empirically a meaningful
association either between market conduct and per¬
formance, or between structure and market conduct.
It thus becomes expedient to test directly for net
association of market structure to market performance,
leaving the detailed character of the implied linkage
of conduct substantially unascertained.3

Industry Concentration
A widely used industry structural characteristic is
the concentration ratio which measures the percent of an
industry's economic activity accounted for by a specified
number of its largest companies.

With economic activity

measured by sales, employment, value added, or assets,

the

higher the percent of total activity controlled by a small
number of companies, the greater the assumed potential for
maintaining above normal rates of return.
The main source of data for determining concentration
ratios is the Census Bureau, but these census data have

3 Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization
Wiley, 1959), pp. 32i>-32?.

(New York:
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well-known deficiencies.^-

In particular, the industry

definitions often result in poorly delineated markets.

For

some industries the data are too broad to represent the
relevant geographical or product market.

For other in¬

dustries where there are close product substitutes,
data are too limited.

the

Also, these national data are not

representative of localized industries such as bakeries.
Despite these problems, census data are widely used because
of their availability and widespread familiarity.
There have been a number of studies concerned with
the relationship between industry HOI and the degree of
concentration.

One of the earliest was by Bain for the

years 1936-19i|.0.^

Using return after taxes to equity and

eight-firm concentration ratios, he did not find a close
relationship between ROI and concentration.

However, the

industries with eight-firm concentration ratios above
70 percent did tend to have high average rates of return.
Recently Bain’s study was replicated by Yale Brozen
using more recent data.^

Brozen’s research indicated that

^U.S., Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers,
196J, Vol. 1, Summary and Subject Statistics (Washington,
D.d. :
Government Printing Office, 1971).
Ill© limitations
of concentration ratios are discussed in Jules Backman,
Advertising and Competition (New York:
NYU Press, 1967)*
pp.
•
^Joe S. Bain, ’’Relation of Profit Rates to Industry
Concentration,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (August,
195D, PP- 293-32IT
^Yale Brozen, ’’Bain’s Concentration and Rates of Re¬
turn Revisited,” Journal of Law and Economics (October,
1971), PP. 351-3*S^
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Bain’s study may have been biased by inclusion of only large
firms which tended to have high rates of return.

If Bain’s

industry sample was biased, the association he found between
above average ROI and the concentrated group of industries
is open to question.

Brozen's results using more recent

data failed to confirm Bain's conclusion that high rates of
return result from concentration.
A well-known study by George Stigler related concentration to rate of return on total assets.

7

By using various

cut-off levels, he divided three-digit SIC industries into
concentrated and unconcentrated groups.

The hypothesis of

a significant association between ROI and concentration ratio
was not confirmed.

However, partly because of the high

level of aggregation (three-digit SIC level), his results
were ambiguous.®
Using a multiple regression model, Marshall Hall and
Leonard Weiss related several variables,
centration ratio, to two measures of ROI:

including the con¬
income after

taxes to book equity and income after taxes to total assets.
^George J. Stigler, Capital and Rates of Return in
Manufacturing Industries (Princeton:
Princeton University
Press, 1%3).
D

°For a discussion of the problems of using data that
are aggregated above the four-digit SIC level, see Lester G.
Telser, ’’Advertising and Competition,” Journal of Political
Economy (December, 196if), pp. 537-5^2.
^Marshall Hall and Leonard Weiss, ’’Firm Size and Prof¬
itability,” Review of Economics and Statistics (August,
1967), pp. 319-331.

9
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Concentration, measured by four-firm ratios, was a statis¬
tically significant determinant of ROI, but its influence
on rate of return was less important than that of company
size, a possible capital barrier to entry.
Considering these ambiguous results from studies
relating concentration ratios to ROI, the conclusion that
concentration and performance are positively related can
be only weakly accepted at best.

Concentration ratios

may be useful as substitute measures for company behavior
which determines performance.

The ratios, however, really

measure only the potential for market control.

As a con¬

sequence, additional information can be gained by studying
the possible barriers to entry that are erected and main¬
tained by firms in a noncompetitive industry.

Therefore,

it seems prudent to couple the concentration variable with
measures of possible barriers to entry such as the adver¬
tising to sales ratio, average company size, and research
and development intensity.

Research and Development Intensity

As a determinant of ROI, research and development
(R&D) can be considered in two ways:

1)

R&D activity may

or may not produce a marketable or patentable product,
and therefore, such activity is uncertain as to return,
or risky; 2)

Past and present R&D expenditures produce
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knowledge and techniques which give the existing firms in
an industry an advantage over prospective entrants, and
as a result, R&D outlays can be a barrier to entry.

R&D

intensity is a measure of the amount of research and develop¬
ment input in relation to output, with a commonly used
figure being R&D expenditures as a percent of sales.
Research and development can be an ambiguous concept.
Here the term refers to those outlays for materials, facil¬
ities, and wages with the ultimate goal of producing new
products or more efficient production techniques.

R&D can

be separated into basic research where there is no welldefined goal in terms of products or techniques, and
development where a specific product or technique is being
perfected into an economically feasible output.

In report¬

ing financial data, companies lump development expense and
outlays for basic research together as R&D expenditures.1^
Research and development activity is often associated
with risky ventures because the return from R&D expenditures
is uncertain.

This is explained by one author who says that

research is undersupported because of the uncertainty in¬
volved, ”... uncertainty as to income in general and as
10Another problem is that for diversified companies
R&D expenditures are not broken out by product area.
For
example, ethical drug companies’ R&D figures include out¬
lays for research related to non-drug products as well as
for drug research.
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to the ability of the sponsoring firm to exploit a specific
discovery."H

The authors of an article pertaining to the

aerospace industry express a similar view:
Concerning total risk, it is obvious that the greater
the percentage of any firm’s business which involves
research and development the higher the total risk.
Production work is not as risky since past experience
can be more easily applied as a yardstick to estimate
future performance regarding quality, timing, and
costs.
This view leads to the conclusion that R&D outlays consti¬
tute a special type of risk, and therefore,

R&D intensity

and ROI should be positively related in the same manner as
risk and ROI.
When the uncertainty related to R&D outlays is con¬
sidered, the similar effects of expenditures on research
and increasing production to fulfill growth in demand be¬
come apparent.

These effects are not the same as general

business risk, however, because management consciously sub¬
jects the firm’s future earnings to this uncertainty.

Con¬

sequently, the degree of uncertainty can be controlled to
some extent by limiting growth or research activity.
A second way of relating R&D intensity and ROI
utilizes the concept of market power.

Extensive research

^Daniel Hamberg, R&D Essays on the Economics of Re¬
search and Development (New York:
Random, 19b6), p. £3.
1p
^Aerospace Research Center, Aerospace Profits Vs.
Risks (Washington, D.C.:
Aerospace Industries Association
o^ America, 1971)# p. 2.
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and development activity, especially coupled with the patent
privilege, can create products and productive processes that
cannot be duplicated or matched by other firms, particularly
by prospective entrants into an industry.

Thus, Rfid) outlays

are a possible barrier to competitive entry.

For example,

Hugh Walker describes how this may be very important to
ethical drug manufacturers:
The principal sources of market power are the peculiar
protection enjoyed by drug manufacturers because of
the brand names used in the ethical drug industry and
the provision of patent protection for the more
recently introduced drugs.
Brand names and patent
protection permit firms to charge prices which are
very much higher than the prices that would exist in
the absence of market power.^3
Some view the market power and economic rewards
accruing from R&D activity as completely compatible with a
competitive system.

R&D expenditures are characterized as

capital attracted by the potential for above average rates
of return.

It is argued that the market power given by

patents was consciously created to generate just such re¬
search activity.

For example, Jesse Markham states:

The drug industry’s record of profits and
expenditures for research and development suggests
that the private interests of the individual drug
firms and the public interest are served compatibly
by the search for new and improved drugs. . . .
Competition through vigorous inventive effort has
also been highly profitable, keeping the ethical

^Hugh D. Walker, Market Power and Price Levels in
the Ethical Drug Industry (Bloomington:
Indiana University
Press, 1971), p. 3.

70

drug industry among the top three most profitable
industries. • . .^hThere are,

then, two views of the effects of R&D

expenditures as a source of market power.

One holds that

this potential for some market control leads to socially
desirable research, that firms compete to do this research
in order to obtain the reward of a higher rate of return.
The other sees patents and other aspects of market control
arising from R&D activity as an undesirable means of holding
rates of return above competitive levels.

Both views pre¬

dict that relatively high R&D intensity will be associated
with higher than average ROI.
There has been only limited empirical research
relating R&D intensity to ROI.

Such research has been

greatly hampered by the almost total lack of data for
individual companies and limited industry data.
data source,

The main

the National Science Foundation (NSF), pub¬

lishes industry R&D figures at the two- and three-digit
SIC levels, but such highly aggregated figures are of only
limited value for studying industry ROI.^

Also, the NSF

reports are incomplete in that data for various years and

^Jesse W. Markham, ’’Economic Incentives and Progress
in the Drug Industry,” in Drugs in Our Society, ed. by Paul
Talahay (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, l%i4.), pp. 175-176.
■^U.S., National Science Foundation, Research and
Development in Industry, 1970 (Washington, D.C.:
Oovemraent Printing Office, 1971)•
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industries are missing.

Only limited R&D information is

obtainable from annual reports and such reference sources
as Moody1 s Manuals.^
Of the few empirical studies, most find a significant,
but weak, positive relationship between ROI and R&D in¬
tensity.

The first of two such studies by William Leonard

related growth rate of R&D intensity to growth rates of
sales, assets, and net income.

17

R&D intensity was measured

by research expenditures as a percent of sales and by the
number of research scientists and engineers per 1000
employees.

Using a sample of sixteen manufacturing in¬

dustries, Leonard found a significant correlation between
growth in R&D intensity and change in both sales and assets.
However, the correlation with growth in net income after
taxes was not significant, although it was positive as
predicted.
A second, unpublished,

study by Leonard concerned

the effects of market structure, especially R&D intensity
T ft

as a barrier to entry, on rates of return. °

The correla¬

tion between return after taxes on stockholders'
^Moody's Industrial Manuals (New York:
Investors Services, inc., 1963-1971)•

investment

Moody's

■^William N. Leonard, "Research and Development in
Industrial Growth," Journal of Political Economy (MarchApril, 1971), pp. 232-256.
^William N. Leonard, "Significance to the Pharma¬
ceutical Industry of the Article 'R&D, Product Differen¬
tiation and Market Performance,'" Hempstead, N.Y., June 2,
1971•
(Typewritten.)
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and R&D expenditures as a percent of sales was .80 for the
period 1960-1969.
In two studies, Edwin Mansfield found some support
for a significant relation between ROI and R&D expenditures.
One of his articles related research and development out¬
lays as a percent of sales to rates of return for industries
where direct government financing is limited (e.g., chemicals,
petroleum, drugs, glass, and steel).

19

Although his empirical

results lend some support to the hypothesis of a positive
R&D/ROI association, the results are hardly conclusive.
There was little evidence to support the related hypothesis
that larger companies spend a higher percentage of sales on
R&D than do smaller firms.
Instead of relating R&D intensity to ROI, Mansfield
attempted to calculate the marginal rate of return from
R&D expenditures in his second study.

20

Using a series of

simplifying assumptions, he estimated very high marginal
rates of return on R&D outlays for ten petroleum and chemical
firms.

For example, the petroleum sample's average rate

was about I4.O to 60 percent a year for the period 1946-1962.

19

Edwin Mansfield, "Industrial Research and Develop¬
ment Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy (August,
1961^), pp. 319-340.
20

Edwin Mansfield, "Rates of Return from Industrial
Research and Development," Papers and Proceeding of the
Seventy-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic
Association (dhlcago , 1964)» pp. 310-*
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Although Mansfield’s results are not very precise and should
be treated cautiously,

they suggest that firms with high R&D

intensity should exhibit high rates of return on investment.

21

Jora Minasian has also calculated marginal rates of
return from research and development expenditures.

Using

1948-1957 data for a sample of seventeen chemical firms,
Minasian found an average rate of return on gross invest¬
ment of 9 percent while the return on research expenditures
was 54 percent.
Although not conclusive, the statistical evidence
reinforces the expectation of a positive association between
R&D intensity and ROI.

The most likely explanation for this

association is that research and development activity gives
existing firms in an industry an advantage over prospective
entrants.

Uncertainty regarding the return from R&D outlays

adds to the hesitancy of new firms in entering the industry.

Company Size

When the effects of imperfect competition on ROI are

21

For a summary article on research and development
activity and its effects on rates of return, see Edwin
Mansfield, ”Industrial Research and Development:
Charac¬
teristics, Costs, and Diffusion of Results,” Papers and
Proceeding of the Eighty-First Annual Meeting of the
American Economic Association (Chicago, 1960), pp. £>5-71 •
22

Jora R. Minasian, ’’Research and Development, Pro¬
duction Functions, and Rates of Return,” Papers and Pro¬
ceedings of the Eighty-First Annual Meeting" of the American
Economic Association (Chicago, T$58), pp. o0-b5«
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being considered, firm size is often cited as a possible
barrier to entry.

Prospective entrants may be reluctant

to join an industry where a large minimum amount of capital
is necessary to start production.

Explaining the relation¬

ship between size and rate of return, Baumol says,
. . . increased money capital will not only increase
the total profits of the firm, but because it puts
the firm in a higher echelon of imperfectly competing
capital groups, it may very well also increase its
earnings per dollar of investment. . . .^3
There have been a number of empirical studies that
test the hypothesis of a positive association between
average firm size and average industry rate of return.

For

example, Roger Sherman and Robert Tollison added average
firm size to the Fisher and Hall model described above.
They found the association between size, measured by
averaging 1957 and 1964 total assets, and income after
taxes to net worth to be significant and positive.
ever, when a risk variable

How¬

(variance of return) was added

to the regression, the size/ROI relation became not sig¬
nificant
^■^Williara J. Baumol, Business Behavior, Value and
Growth (New York:
Macmillan, 195?), p. 33.
^Roger Sherman and Robert Tollison, "Technology,
Profit Risk, and Assessments of Market Performance,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics (August, 1972), pp. 448“
462.
The original model is described in I. N. Fisher and
G. R. Hall, "Risk and Corporate Rates of Return," Quarterly
Journal of Economics (February, 1969), pp. 79-92.
29
^The problems that complicate interpretation of
variance as discussed above preclude any meaningful con¬
clusions about this result.
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The proper accounting figure to use as a size measure
has been discussed by Hall and Weiss.

In explaining their

definition, the reciprocal of the logarithm of total assets,
the authors argue that,

"assets are superior to equity .

.

.

because it is the size of the total lump of capital, however
financed, that determines the opportunities available to
the firm.”^

Use of the logarithmic form is based on their

assumption that raising an additional percentage of assets
is more nearly comparable between firms of disparate size
than the difficulty of raising an additional absolute amount
of capital.

The authors chose the reciprocal as they be¬

lieved a larger firm finds it easier to raise an additional
percentage of assets than does a smaller firm.

With either

of two ROI measures, income after taxes to net worth or
income after taxes to assets, the regression coefficient
for the size variable was significant and positive as hypo¬
thesized.
In an intra-industry comparison of ROI and size,
Malitzahu Marcus found only a weak association.
his definitions for ROI
and for size

27

(income before taxes to net assets)

(net assets) are not unusual, Marcus1

^Hall and Weiss,
p. 322.

Although

study

’’Firm Size and Profitability,”

^Malitzahu Marcus, ’’Profitability and Size of Firm:
Some Further Evidence,” Review of Economics and Statistics
(February, 1969), pp. 104-107.
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is unique in its use of intra-industry data since most
studies relate size and rate of return by industry rather
than by firm.

The weak results indicate there is little

association between ROI and size within industries.
The evidence is sufficient to conclude that firm
size may very well be a significant determinant of ROI.
Although the best means of measuring size is the subject
of continued debate, any one of the commonly used asset
measures seems to exhibit a positive association with rate
of return.

Advertising and Promotional Intensity

Advertising and other promotional activity can be
such an important determinant of sales that a company with
a well-established marketing program may have significant
advantages over potential competitors.

High advertising

and promotional intensity may, therefore, be a barrier to
entry.
There have been a number of studies relating adver¬
tising and rate of return, including a well-known report
by William Comanor and Thomas Wilson.

28

Using a regression

equation with income after taxes to net worth as the

^William S. Comanor and Thomas Wilson, "Advertising,
Market Structure, and Performance," Review of Economics and
Statistics (November, 1967), pp. 423“440*«~"
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dependent variable and the advertising to sales ratio as one
of the independent variables, the authors identified adver¬
tising as a significant explanatory variable.

This rein¬

forces the belief that extensive advertising can be an
important barrier to entry.
Whereas Comanor and Wilson used a consumer goods in¬
dustry sample, Richard Miller conducted a similar study but
Included both consumer and producer goods Industries.^9
His results also confirm a significant positive association
between advertising intensity and rate of return,
A monograph by Jules Backman attempted to test the
claim that intensive advertising can lead to anti-competitive
behavior and above normal rates of return.

In reporting the

empirical results, he says:
Intensive advertising tends to be accompanied by higher
reported profit rates.
However, the difference in
return among companies with varying rates of adver¬
tising intensity tends to be moderate.30
Backman suggests that the effects of advertising cannot be
separated from other ROI determinants such as R&D intensity,
growth in demand, or risk, and therefore, these variables
must be considered together.
A researcher who has written extensively about adver¬
tising is critical of accepting the belief that advertising
leads to monopoly power.

Lester Telser states:

^Richard A. Miller, "Market Structure and Industrial
Performance.” Journal of Industrial Economics (April, 1969),
pp. IOI4.-II8.
^Backman, Advertising and Competition, p. 15k*
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Everyone knows the contention that advertising is a
source of monopoly and, therefore, expects a positive
association between the two*
But intensive adver¬
tising is often an instrument of competition as well.
The entry of new firms and the offering of new brands
is frequently accompanied by high advertising expendi¬
tures.
Hence advertising can enhance competition.
Even if advertising does reduce competition in some
cases, it can increase it in others.
The net effect
reveals itself by the absence of a dependable relation
between the advertising and the concentration ratios.31
3he controversy goes on as to whether advertising
creates monopoly and ultimately leads to higher than com¬
petitive rates of return.

As stated above by Telser, no

dependable relation between advertising and concentration
has been established.

Apparently there is a significant,

positive association between advertising and ROI, but the
linkage between the two is not clear.
Another thorny problem is the question of causality,
since regression and correlation cannot establish the
direction of cause and effect.

It is possible that a

positive relation exists between advertising and ROI be¬
cause a high rate of return provides the financing to
utilize intensive advertising.

Comanor and Wilson, who

explicitly review this question, offer arguments supportive
of the conclusion that the direction of causality is from
advertising to rate of return.^2

^Lester G. Telser, "Another Look at Advertising and
Concentration," Journal of Industrial Economics (November,
1969), p. 94.
■^Comanor and Wilson,
and Performance," p. 437*

"Advertising, Market Structure,
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Multicollinearity and Interaction

In the studies cited above there are numerous state¬
ments suggesting interaction among the determinants of ROI.
Growth in demand and R&D activity both may contribute to
variability of return, a measure of risk; advertising and
promotional intensity may be correlated with the concentra¬
tion ratio; several of the variables may be closely related
to company size.

Multicollinearity among independent

variables can cause a variable that is significant as a
determinant of ROI by itself to become not significant when
included with other independent variables.
Interaction among the determinants may have important
effects on rates of return, and these effects may be more
than just additive.

High growth in demand coupled with

high risk might result in extremely high rates of return
as investors demand to be compensated for this unique com¬
bination of investment characteristics.

Similar results

could be forthcoming if high R&D intensity and high minimum
size are combined, in this case because of the potential for
market control.

These examples, of course, are merely in¬

dicative of the many combinations that might occur.
Summary
Two types of ROI determinants have been identified—
investment characteristics and structural characteristics.
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In Chapter III, investment characteristics including risk
and growth in demand were discussed along with an explana¬
tion of how these determinants of ROI could lead to above
normal rates of return even in a competitive industry.
Hie structural characteristics, discussed in this chapter,
are measures of market power which also may determine rate
of return.

Of the structural characteristics,

the concen¬

tration ratio is an indication of potential market control
while R&£) intensity, company size, and advertising intensity
are measures of possible barriers to competitive entry.
There may be other determinants of ROI than the ones
considered here.

However, with the concepts developed to

date and with the available data,

it is unlikely that the

inclusion of more variables in the ROI model would provide
much additional information.

Most likely the added variables

would be closely related statistically to the ones already
discussed.
The methodology of this study is to combine as many
of the determinants of ROI as possible into a multiple
regression model and to evaluate their individual and joint
effects on ROI.

The next chapter explicitly defines each

of the variables, describes the model, and discusses the
hypotheses the model is designed to test.
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CHAPTER

V

A RETURN ON INVESTMENT MODEL

Hie ROI model developed in this chapter is designed
to determine if the ethical drug industry’s relatively
high rate of return can be explained statistically.
Objective testing of the hypothesized relationships between
ROI and its determinants is facilitated by the use of a
symbolic model.

Hypotheses

The initial set of hypotheses concerns the relation¬
ship between ROI and each of the determinants of return.
In this study, a positive association between rate of
return and each of the investment and structural charac¬
teristics is hypothesized.
Once these relationships have been tested, the central
question regarding the drug industry's rate of return can
be considered.

The hypothesis is that ethical drug industry

average return on investment is the same as a11-manufacturing
industries’ average return on investment after consideration
of investment and structural characteristics.
General Form

To test the hypotheses regarding the association
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between ROI and each of the determinants of ROI, a simple,
linear, least-squares regression model is used of the form:

Y = Bq + B^X^ + e

where Y is ROI, BQ the intercept term, B^ the coefficient
for the independent variable,
and e the error term.

the independent variable,

The error term indicates the degree

of variation of individual observations around the regres¬
sion line.
turn,

Using data for each independent variable in

statistical techniques including t and F tests are

exploited to evaluate the resulting equations.

These

statistical results, along with the logical arguments pre¬
sented in Chapters III and IV, are used to specify the
variables included in the final ROI model.
The model of return on investment is a cross-sectional,
least-squares, multiple regression equation with ROI as the
dependent variable and a series of investment and structural
characteristics for independent variables.

Expressed

symbolically, the model is

Y = Bq + ®i^l +

+ *

*

• * ®n^n + e

As in the simple regression model, Y is ROI, Bq the inter¬
cept, Bn the coefficients of the independent variables, Xn
the independent variables, and e the error term.
The intercept term, B^, has special economic sig¬
nificance since it can be interpreted as a rate of return
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after consideration of investment and structural character¬
istics.

The influence of these characteristics on ROI is,

of course, measured by their respective regression co¬
efficients.

As an adjusted rate of return, Bq can be com¬

pared to rates of return from investment in certain govern¬
ment securities which are assumed to be unaffected by the
type of investment and structural characteristics associated
with the independent variables.

Definition of the Variables

In this section each of the variables identified as
a possible determinant of ROI Is defined.
explanatory variables

The first three

(variance, skewness, and growth) are

investment characteristics, while the other four (concen¬
tration ratio, R&D intensity, company size, and advertising
intensity) are structural characteristics.
Use of data for only one year in the cross-sectional
model would tie the results to the unique economic charac¬
teristics of that year, and attempts to generalize such
results would be of questionable validity.

Therefore, data

over several years are averaged to give a single figure for
each variable for each industry.

Unless otherwise noted,

the time period, t, is nine years for each variable;1 n,
^For some companies, R&D expenditures are not reported
for all nine years.
In those cases, R&D intensity is com¬
puted from the data for the years reported,
IJie number of
years, t, then becomes less than nine.

the number of companies, is four to twelve per four-dig it
SIC industry;

2

X is an observation on ROI for one company

in one year.
Return on investment.

With the goal of making inter¬

industry comparisons in mind, ROI is defined as net income
after taxes

(NI) divided by net worth (NW).

Each observa¬

tion is as follows:

Industry Average ROI = ~

~

NI/NW

Net income after taxes divided by net worth is used
in the expectation that competitive entry and exit of
firms would bring this figure towards equality.

Net worth

is used in the denominator because it is rate of return on
equity which managers should seek to maximize if they are
acting in the stockholders* best interests.

Even under

pure competition, it would not be expected that diverse
industries would have equal rates of return on assets be¬
cause of different capital structures.

For example, if

banks, with their very high debt ratios, earned the same
rate of return on assets as manufacturing firms, the banks
would have extremely high rates of return on equity.

There¬

fore, it is expected that in competitive long-run equilibrium
rate of return on equity would tend to be equalized.

2Table 10 in Appendix II lists the industries with the
number of companies in each.
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It was noted in Chapter II that there ia disagreement
among researchers regarding the effects of capital struc¬
ture on ROI and on the risk/return relationship.

To

evaluate the possibility that using return on net worth
biases the relationship between ROI and the risk measure,
two alternative configurations of the regression model
are tested.

First, the ROI variable is redefined as rate

of return on net book assets which gives a return figure
not affected by financial leverage.

Second, the ratio

of total debt to total assets is added to the regression
equation with ROI defined as return on net worth.
Variance.
the model.

Two measures of risk are incorporated into

The first is average variance of individual

company rates of return around the industry mean averaged
•j

over time:^

Industry Average Variance =
t*—

2U _
n-1

This ia an inter-spatial measure of variance of return.
The denominator of the variance formula is one leas than
the number of firms in the industry

(n-1)

to adjust for

the small sample sizes.^
^See Appendix I for additional discussion of the use
of variance as a measure of risk.
‘h'he number of companies per industry ranges from
four to twelve.
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Since squared deviations give greater weight to extreme
values, it is possible that variance may be a biased risk
measure when applied to industries with relatively high
variability of return.

Bias could be present for individual

industries even though variance and standard deviation as
measures of risk are highly correlated for an all-manufac¬
turing industries sample.^

To test for the possible exis¬

tence of bias, the standard deviation is substituted for
variance in the final equation and the results evaluated.
A positive association between ROI and variability
of return is hypothesized under the assumption that the
higher the ex post variability of return, the greater the
uncertainty associated with the return.

Risk-averse in¬

vestors are assumed to dislike uncertainty and, therefore,
to expect a higher rate of return to offset the uncertainty.
Skewness.

The second risk variable is skewness,

measured by a dummy variable to eliminate the difficulties
of interpreting the units of the skewness variable.^
any case,

in

the hypothesis only relates to the sign of the

skewness measure, not to its value.

To compute skewness

requires finding the second and third moments, m2 and m^,

^See Appendix I for evidence of the degree of cor¬
relation between standard deviation and variance.
^For a brief discussion of the ambiguities inherent
in calculating and interpreting values for the coefficient
of skewness, see Samuel B. Richmond, Statistical Analysis
(New York:
Ronald, 1964), pp. 73“76, 90-95*
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respectively, of the distribution of ROI:

m2
c

m

=ZjX=Il£
n-1
=^(X-X)3

3

n-1

The coefficient of skewness, B, is the ratio of the third
moment squared to the second moment cubed:

B =
(m2)3
Therefore,

Industry Average Skewness = —
t^

B

Each industry is assigned a dummy variable with a
value of 0, 1, or 2 corresponding to an average co¬
efficient of skewness that is positive,
As explained in Chapter III,

zero, or negative.*^

investors are presumed to

like positive skewness and dislike negative skewness which
implies a negative ROI/skewness relationship.

By assigning

a higher number (2) to negative skewness and a lower number
(0) to positive skewness, a positive association is pre¬
dicted between ROI and the dummy skewness variable.
?For a discussion regarding the use of dummy variables,
see Daniel B. Suits, ’’Use of Dummy Variables in Regression
Equations,” Journal of the American Statistical Association
(December, 1^57), pp. 5W-55T.-
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Growth In demand.

As growth is a time concept, a

cross-sectional study requires the averaging of annual
rates of growth in demand for individual firms.

Annual

company rates are calculated by fitting a least-squares
trend line to company sales over time to find the slope
(S).

The industry figure is.

Industry Average Growth

The predicted positive association between ROI and
growth in demand is based on the following rationale :
When the firms in an industry experience more rapid growth
in capital requirements than growth in capital supply,
they must bid up ROI to attract the desired capital.

This

growth premium is required by investors to compensate for
the costs associated with increasing the proportion of
their portfolios allocated to firms in the rapidly growing
industry.

A growth premium would be required also, to the

extent investors associate above average growth with future
uncertainty.
Industry concentration.

Concentration is measured

by Bureau of the Census, four-digit SIC industry concen¬
tration ratios
used:

(CR).

Three different sets of ratios are

four- and eight-firm ratios based on value added in

manufacture and four-firm ratios of total employees.
several cases the industries used are defined slightly

In
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differently in the data source

(Standard and Poor’s Corapustat

Tape) than the industries in the Bureau of the Census data.
To obtain concentration ratios for these industries, a tech¬
nique suggested by Stigler is used whereby the desired
ratios are calculated by combining industries using industry
Q

value added as weights.
A positive association between ROI and concentration
ratio is hypothesized based on the rationale that the
potential for market control is greater in a concentrated
industry.

Exercise of this potential is expected to lead

to artificially high rates of return.
Research and Development Intensity.

The measure for

R&D intensity is average company R&D expenditures divided
by company net sales in each time period (R&D/S).

The form

of the variable is.

Industry Average R&D Intensity = ^ ^

1

R&D/S

Company R&D expenditures are used because R&D outlays are
reported in this manner in the data source.

For inter¬

industry comparisons, company outlays seem to be the proper
figure as opposed to total industry R&D expenditures since
Q

U.S., Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers,
1967> Vol. 1, Summary and Subject Statistics (Washington,
D.CT:
Government Printing Office, 1971).
q

George J. Stigler, Capital and Rates of Return in
Manufacturing Industries (Princeton:
Princeton University
Press, 1463)7 PP* 206-211.
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the latter figure includes government outlays.
R&D intensity is expected to be positively associated
with rate of return on the assumption that research activity
can create a barrier to entry allowing existing firms to
insulate themselves from potential competitors.

Uiis

situation could result in artificially high rates of return.
Company size.

Size, which may represent a capital

barrier to entry, is measured as total assets less accumu¬
lated depreciation (TA).

Two configurations are considered:

absolute total assets in dollars and the logarithm to the
base ten of total assets.

Rie hypothesis of a positive

association between ROI and each of these size measures
derives from size being a possible barrier to competitive
entry.

The form of the variable is.

Industry Average Company Size =

Use of the logarithmic form is based on the
assumption that raising an additional percentage of assets
is more nearly comparable between firms of disparate size
than the difficulty of raising an absolute amount of
capital.
Advertising and Promotional Intensity.

This possible

ROI determinant is measured by the ratio of company adver¬
tising and promotional expense to company sales

(AE/S):
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Industry Average Advertising _ 1 sr~ 1
and Promotional Intensity
t
n

ae/S

Many companies do not report advertising and promotional
expenses as a separate item but lump these outlays with
general and administrative expense.
The regression model does not include an advertising
intensity variable, in part because of the ambiguous results
of other studies, but more importantly, only about 10 per¬
cent of the sample of firms taken from the Corapustat Tape
included data on advertising and promotional expense.^
It was decided that the addition of data from a different
sample of firms to get an average advertising intensity
figure for each industry would lead to interpretational
problems.

Multicollinearity
Two methods are used to evaluate the extent of
multicollinearity among the ROI determinants used in the
model.

The first is to study the partial correlation

coefficients.
niques:

The second method uses correlation tech¬

certain determinants of ROI are picked for use as

the dependent variable with other determinants as indepen¬
dent variables in a regression equation.

Particular

■^See Chapter IV for a review of prior research
regarding the association between ROI and advertising
intensity.
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combinations are based on the logical associations discussed
in Chapters III and IV,

For instance, some researchers

have suggested that growth in demand and R&D intensity are
related to ROI because investments with high growth rates
or high R&D intensity are riskier than investments without
these characteristics.

Therefore, the risk measure,

variance of return, is used as the dependent variable with
growth in demand and R&D intensity as independent variables.
A second test uses the concentration ratio as the
dependent variable with R&D intensity and company size as
independent variables.

This combination relates the con¬

centration ratio as a measure of potential market power to
two measures of possible barriers to entry.
The correlations calculated using these combinations
of structural and investment characteristics help to explain
why some of the variables are not statistically significant
and help also in the evaluation of whether R&D intensity
and growth in demand are in fact alternative risk measures.

Summary

A cross-sectional, multiple regression model was
formulated in this chapter which relates ROI to interspatial variance of return, skewness of return, growth in
demand, concentration ratio, R&D intensity, and company
size.

Each of these investment and structural characteristics
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was defined explicitly using a rationale developed by
logical reasoning and a review of prior research.
/.

The hypothesized relationships between rate of
return and each of these possible ROI determinants are
tested in Chapter VI leading to a final model of return
on investment which is used to study ethical drug industry
ROI.

f
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CHAPTER

VI

TESTING AND USING THE MODEL

One purpose of developing a model of ROI is to pro¬
vide a means of testing statistically hypotheses regarding
industry rates of return.

The model described in the

previous chapter is used to compare ethical drug industry
ROI with the rate of return for a sample of other manu¬
facturing industries.
Before using the model to study the drug industry,
it is necessary to test statistically the significance of
the industry’s apparent high rate of return.

Second, the

significance of the model's components must be tested and
evaluated.

The entire model is then evaluated using various

statistical methods and using the aerospace industry in a
test run.

The final step is to forecast ethical drug in¬

dustry ROI and compare the result with the observed rate.

Hypotheses

The main hypothesis is that ethical drug industry
average return on investment is the same as all-manufacturing
industries average return on investment after consideration
of the determinants of ROI.

Use of these determinants in

the model requires acceptance of the hypothesis that there
is a significant positive association between ROI and each
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of the six determinants whioh are measured by variance of
return, skewness of return, growth in demand, concentration
ratio, R&D intensity, and company size.^

Data

Book value data were obtained from Standard and Poor’s
Compustat Tape for a random sample of 350 companies grouped
into 41 manufacturing industries.

Elimination of all in¬

dustries containing fewer than four companies resulted in
a sample of 1 45 companies in 23 industries.

p

For each

company, the observations were then adjusted for mergers
and acquisitions and transformed into the measures of the
ROI determinants.

Industry concentration ratios were

taken from the 1967 Census of Manufacturers.^

^Throughout this chapter, any relationship termed
significant refers to its being statistically significant.
2

See Appendix II for a list of the industries along
with their SIC numbers and the number of companies in each
industry.
Industries with fewer than i| companies were
eliminated to lessen the statistical effects of extremely
small industry samples.
Adjustments for mergers and acquisitions were made
to the extent the data for making such adjustments were
reported in Moody’s Industrial Manuals (New York:
Moody’s
Investors Services, Inc., 1963-1971) •
A number of com¬
panies were eliminated because there were insufficient
adjustment data available.
^U.S., Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers,
1967. Vol. 1, Summary and Subject Statistics (Washington,D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1971)*
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Rates of Return

When rates of return are compared without holding the
ROI determinants constant, average rate of return for the
ethical drug industry is significantly higher than for
the all-manufacturing sample.

This relationship is depicted

in Figure 3 by plotting all-manufacturing ROI along with
the least-squares trend line for the years 1963-1971.^
As the trend line is calculated from a sample, it is neces¬
sary to establish a confidence interval for the trend line.^
The equation for the boundaries of the confidence interval
is
Y = B0 +

+ tS

where Bq is the Y intercept, B-^ is the slope of the trend
line,

denotes time, t is the student's t value, and S

is the standard error of the trend line.

Ethical drug

industry ROI is then plotted with the least-squares trend
line for the same time period.^
Ihe drug industry observations and their trend line

^The data are listed in Appendix II.
The all¬
manufacturing sample does not include the ethical drug
industry.
^For an explanation of this technique, see Samuel B.
Richmond, Statistical Analysis (2d ed.; New York:
Ronald,
196]+), pp. ldd-190; and Arthur S. Goldberger, Econometric
Theory (New York:
Wiley, 1961+), p. 179.
?The companies in the ethical drug industry sample
are listed in Appendix II.
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are above the upper boundary of the a11-manufacturing con¬
fidence interval; this establishes that before consideration
of the ROI determinants, ethical drug industry average rate
of return is significantly higher than a11-manufacturing

The trend lines for the two samples

industries average ROI.

are roughly parallel and have a negative slope over the
nine years.

This coordinated movement of the rates of

return indicates that ROI for the drug industry is affected
by cyclical change in about the same way as that of manu¬
facturing industries in general.

Because the time span is

relatively short, no meaningful interpretation of the nega-

g

tive slope is possible.

Regression Results

The first step in attempting to establish the
determinants of ROI as significant explanatory variables is
to use each individually in a simple linear regression.

In

this way, the regression coefficient of each of the vario

ables and the summary statistics in Table I4. are calculated.
In the simple regression runs, skewness and growth are
significant; none of the other variables is significant; and
only variance and R&D intensity have the hypothesized positive

®The years 1963-1971 roughly cover one business cycle.
To interpret the meaning of the negative slope would require
at least several cycles and preferably more.
^The regression data are listed in Appendix II.

»
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TABLE 4
STATISTICAL RESULTS--SIMPLE REGRESSION

Independent
Variable

R

Variance

.28

1.69

1.31

20

Skewness

• 43

4.61

2.15

20

.05

Growth

.60 11.45

3-39

20

.01

R&D Intensity

.12

0.20

o.45

15

Not Significant

Size:
Total Assets .08

0.12

0.35

20

.07

0.11

0.32

20

Not Significant &
Negative
Not Significant &
Negative

.05

0.04

0.20

20

.02

0.01

0.10

20

.33

2.39

1.55

20

Log^Q Total
Assets
Concentration
Ratio:
4-Firm Value
Added
8-Firm Value
Added
4-Firm Total
Employees

F
Test

t
Test

(D.P.)

Level of
Significance

Not Significant

Not Significant &
Negative
Not Significant &
Negative
Not Significant &
Negative
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sign.

Although not quite significant, the t value for

variance is sufficiently high to indicate that this variable
is a potentially useful explanatory variable for ROI.

Of

the remaining variables including R&D intensity, size, and
concentration ratio, only the Iv-firm total employees measure
of the concentration ratio has any indication of potential
significance; however, its coefficient has the wrong sign.
Although the discussion of these regression results is de¬
ferred until later, it should be noted here that a non¬
significant variable in a simple regression equation may
become significant when included with other independent
variables.
The next stage in evaluating the significance of the
ROI determinants is to test the six measures together in a
multiple regression model.

For the first run, only the 17

industries with R&D intensity data are included.1^
As summarized in Table 5, the statistical results
indicate that only skewness is significant.

Again, the t

statistic for variance is sufficiently high to indicate at
least potential explanatory value.

Growth, a significant

variable in the previous run,

is not significant in this

multiple regression; however,

it does have the predicted

positive sign.

Size,

R&D intensity, and concentration ratio

^For 5 of the 22 industries sampled, data on R&D
expenditures are not reported on the Corapustat Tape.
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TABLE 5
STATISTICAL RESULTS—MULTIPLE REGRESSION
(17 Industries)

Independent Variable

t Test (10
DP)

Level of Significance

Variance

1.76

Not Significant

Skewness

1.86

.10

Growth

0.90

Not Significant

R&D Intensity

0.65

Not Significant

Concentration Ratio
(4-Firm Value Added)
Size
(Log^Q Total Assets)

0.21

Not Significant &:
Negative
Not Significant &
Negative

0.10

•

Correlation Matrix

ROI
VARIANCE
SKEWNESS
SIZE
R&D
GROWTH
CR

ROI
1.0

VARIANCE
.I4.O3
1.000

SKEWNESS

.426
- .267
1.000

SIZE

-.079

R&D

.114

GROWTH

.523

-.281
.483 .479
.105 - .276
.145
1.000 -.264 -.225

1.000

.204
1.000

CR
- .090
.281
- • 492
.160
.165
.207
1 .000
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are all again not significant, and of these three variables,
only R&D intensity has the expected positive sign.

Just one

measure for the concentration ratio and one measure for size
are used as earlier results indicated that the different
measures for each variable are essentially interchangeable.
In this first run of the multivariate model, statistical
testing is hampered by the few degrees of freedom available.11
By eliminating the R&D intensity variable it is pos¬
sible to include all 22 industries in the second run of
the multiple regression model.

12

Variance,

skewness, and

growth are all significant, and each has the predicted
positive relation with ROI.

Neither the concentration

ratio nor size is significant, and the concentration ratio
has a negative sign.
In the two multiple regressions and in the simple
regression runs, the concentration ratio, R&D intensity,
and size are nowhere significant.

Therefore, these three

variables are dropped from further consideration.

This

lack of significance may be accounted for by collinearity
between the variables that are significant including

ll-The first multiple regression run which includes
the R&D intensity variable has only 10 degrees of freedom.
With so few degrees of freedom, the F and t values must be
relatively high to be significant.
The statistical summary of this run is contained
in Table 6.
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TABLE 6
STATISTICAL RESULTS--MULTIPLE REGRESSION
(22 Industries)a

Independent Variable

t Test (16 DF) Level of Significance

Variance

1.73

.10

Skewness

2.08

.05

Growth

2.96

.01

Concentration Ratio
(If-Firm Value Added)
Size
(Log^Q Total Assets)

1.47
.93

Not Significant &
Negative
Not Significant

Correlation Matrix

ROI
VARIANCE
SKEWNESS
SIZE
GROWTH
CR

ROI
1.0

VARIANCE
.279
1.000

SKEWNESS SIZE
-.072
•433
-.368
-.348
.100
1.000
1.000

GROWTH

CR

.603 -.045
.304 .102
.098 - .2 79
-.120
.294
l.oco
.458
1.000

aR&D Intensity omitted for lack of data.

10k

variance,

skewness, and growth, and those that are not sig¬

nificant.

For example, the partial correlation coefficient

for variance and R&D intensity is 0.48.

Collinearity can

cause a variable to be not significant because the sig¬
nificant variable with which it is collinear steals the
nonsignificant variable’s explanatory power.
A third run of the multivariate model uses only those
variables that are significant in at least one previous
run:

variance,

11
skewness, and growth. J

In this run, each

of the independent variables is statistically significant
and has the predicted sign.

As measured by the F test,

the equation is significant at the .01 level.

By using a

Durbin-Watson Test, it is concluded that no serial corre¬
lation exists in the error terms. ^

Ihis final equation is

accepted as a significant model of ROI for use in inter¬
industry comparisons.
Two modifications to the final equation are made to
isolate possible bias created by variations in capital
structure.

First, return on net book assets is substituted

for return on net worth.

Using this configuration, the

same three variables are significant (variance,

skewness,

and growth) while all the other independent variables are
^See Table 7 for the statistical summary.
^This test is described in J. Durbin and G. S. Watson.
"Testing for Serial Correlation in Least Squares Regression,
Biometrika (December, 1950)* PP* 4°9-428.
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TABLE 7
STATISTICAL RESULTS--FINAL EQUATION

ROI = .0440 + 3.4^8(Variance) + 0.020(Skewness) + 0.232(Growth)
R = 0.77

F Test =8.74 (4>!8 DF)

Independent Variable_t Test

Equation significant at .01

(18 DF) Level of Significance

Variance

2.10

.05

Skewness

3.02

.01

Growth

2.75

.05

Correlation Matrix

ROI
VARIANCE
SKEWNESS
GROWTH

ROI
1.0

Durbin-Watson Test

VARIANCE
.279

1.000

SKEWNESS
-433

-.368
1.000

(k=3 n=22)

Positive Test = 2.52
Negative Test = 1.48

GROWTH

.603
• 303
.098
1.000
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not significant.
total assets,

Second, the debt ratio, total debt to

is included as an independent variable in the

equation with return on net worth as the dependent variable.
The debt ratio is not significant and has a negative sign.
Consequently, there is no evidence that using return on net
worth biases the risk/return relationship.
To evaluate the extent of collinearity, several
regressions are run using different combinations of the
determinants of ROI.

First, variance is used for the

dependent variable with R&D intensity and growth as inde¬
pendent variables to test the idea that relatively high
R&D expenditures and rapid growth create risk.
efficient of multiple correlation
0.65.

The co¬

(R) for this run is

As an explanatory variable for variance, growth is

Just barely significant at the .05 level, and R&D intensity
is not significant at all.

These results provide weak sup¬

port for the contention that relatively high growth results
in high risk.
A second collinearity test relates R&D intensity and
size as measures of barriers to entry to the concentration
ratio, a measure of potential market power.

Ihe multiple

correlation coefficient is only 0.31, and neither size nor
R&D intensity is significant.

Although this test provides

no support for a significant association between the con¬
centration ratio and the two measures of barriers to entry,
the interpretation of the result is hampered by the limited
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R&D data and by the problems which are inherent in the con¬
centration ratio as a measure of market power.^

Discussion of Regression Results

Using the ROI model to study ethical drug industry
rate of return depends on acceptance of the individual
variables chosen as ROI determinants.

The model and the

data can be evaluated to some extent by comparing these
empirical results with the results of previous studies.
In this section,

such comparisons are made in addition to

a review of why each variable is included or left out of
the final model.^
Intercept term.

The intercept term is the rate of

return left after allowing for the investment character¬
istics measured by variance,
therefore,

skewness, and growth, and

it can be compared to the rate of return on

government securities presumably not affected by these
characteristics.

At .044-0 or 4*4 percent,

the intercept

term is s3ightly lower than the 4«74 percent,

1963-1971

average yield on three month U.S. Treasury Bills.^

As

^See the discussion of the R&D intensity and con¬
centration ratio variables in Chapter IV for a review of
these problems.
^The final model and the associated summary statis¬
tics are shown in Table 7*
17
'The figures are from, U.S., Department of Commerce,
Survey of Current Business (Washington, D.C.:
Government
Printing 0??ice,“ 1<&3-I9?1).
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the intercept term is about the same as the Treasury Bill
rate, the conclusion is that the equation does take out
premiums associated with risk and growth leaving a rate of
return adjusted for these investment characteristics.
In models using fewer explanatory variables,

the

intercept term is considerably higher than the Treasury
Bill rate.

For example, the figure in Cootner and Holland’s

equation is 8.20 percent, and Conrad and Plotkin find an
intercept term of 8.6 percent.
variance is considered.
growth are included,

In both studies, only

If the effects of skewness and

the expected result would be a lower

intercept figure such as the one predicted by this model.
Variance.

As hypothesized, inter-spatial variance of

return is a statistically significant explanatory variable
for rate of return, and therefore,

it is used in the final

ROI model.
Skewness.

The prediction of a positive association

between ROI and the dummy skewness variable is confirmed by
the regression results.

This is in agreement with prior

studies which have generally found a negative association
between ROI and the value of the coefficient of skewness;
1 fi

Paul H. Cootner and Daniel M. Holland, ’’Rate of
Return and Business Risk,” The Bell Journal of Economics
and Management Science (Autumn. 1970}," p. 218; Gordon R.
Conrad and Irving H. Plotkin, ”Risk/Return:
U.S. Industry
Pattern,” Harvard Business Review (March-April, 1968),
p. 95.
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an inverted result is obtained in this study by assigning a
lower number (0) to the dummy variable for positive skewness and a higher number

(2) for negative skewness.

19

Use

of a dummy variable eliminates the interpretive problems
and concentrates on the sign of the skewness measure.
There may be additional information to be gained by using
the value of the skewness coefficient as well as its sign,
but in the absence of a measure of skewness which can be
adequately interpreted as a risk measure, use of a dummy
variable seems more reasonable and logical.

The conclusion

is that given present understanding of skewness as a deter¬
minant of ROI, only tests regarding the sign of the coeffi¬
cient can be meaningfully interpreted.

The empirical re¬

sults provide support for the hypothesis that there is a
significant association between ROI and skewness, and there¬
fore, the variable is used in the final model.
Growth in demand.

The finding of a significant

positive association between return on investment and growth
in demand confirms the hypothesis, and growth is used in
the ROI model.

An attempt is made to test empirically the

contention that growth is a form of risk by using variance
as the dependent variable and growth as an independent
variable in a multiple regression.

As growth is not a

■^The use of a dummy variable to measure skewness is
explained in Chapter III.
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significant explanatory variable for the risk measure, there
is no support for a risk and growth association.
Industry concentration.

Although the expectation of

an association between concentration and rate of return is
central to the theory of noncompetitive markets, the con¬
centration ratio is not a significant variable in the re¬
gression model.

This is not too different from other

studies' empirical results which provide weak support for
the hypothesis of a positive association.

20

Consequently,

the variable is not included in the final model.
Lack of significance for the concentration variable
has several possible explanations.

First, the ratio only

measures potential market control, and companies may not
consistently exercise that power.

In other words,

the

variable may not be significant because the concentration
ratio data are inadequate for the task of measuring the
actual use of market power.

Second,

the well-known short¬

comings of the Bureau of the Census data may affect the
significance of the variable.
tion is raulticollinearity.

21

A third possible explana¬

For example, the coefficient

of partial correlation with skewness is 0.28 and with growth
is O.ij.6.
20

See Chapter IV for reviews of research pertaining to
the concentration ratio.
21

These shortcomings are described in the section on
concentration ratios in Chapter IV.

Ill

Research and Development Intensity,

The hypothesis

that R&D intensity is positively associated with ROI is
not confirmed, and as a result, the variable is not used.
Testing this variable is hampered by incomplete data.

In

five of the 22 industries sampled, no R&D. data were obtain¬
able, and in the remaining 17 industries, data for many
firms were available only for a portion of the nine year
sample period.

Until more adequate data are available,

little satisfactory testing can be done regarding the
effects of R&D outlays on ROI.
The collinearity R&D intensity has with other deter¬
minants of ROI also may cause the variable to be not sig¬
nificant.

For example,

the coefficients of partial correla¬

tion are O.I4.8 with variance, 0.28 with skewness, and 0.26
with size.

Ihe degree of correlation with variance lends

some support to the idea that high R&D expenditures create
risk.

When R&D intensity is correlated with the concen¬

tration ratio, there is only a weak association, and conse¬
quently, little evidence that concentration is associated
with R&D outlays.

As stated previously,

the poor R&D

data preclude drawing any defensible conclusions.
Company size.

The size variable’s coefficient is not

significant, and its sign is negative rather than positive
as hypothesized.

These results are compatible with those

of Hall and Weiss who find a significant positive association
between ROI and the reciprocal of the logarithm of total
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assets,

A positive association with the reciprocal of a

measure is comparable to a negative association with the
measure itself.
Lack of significance for the size variable may well
be inherent in the data sample.

The Compustat Tape con¬

tains data on those companies that have the greatest in¬
vestor appeal which tends to bias the sample towards large
companies.

As a result,

may not be revealed.

inter-industry size differences

Hall and Weiss1 use of the much

broader Internal Revenue Service data may account for the
variable being significant in their study.
Another possible explanation for size not being sig¬
nificant is that variable’s collinearity with variance;
the partial coefficient of correlation is

0.35.

Because

size is not a significant explanatory variable for ROI,

it

is not included in the final model.
Evaluation of the statistical results leads to the
conclusion that the final equation is an acceptable model
which relates ROI to variance of return,
turn, and growth in demand.

skewness of re¬

The choice of the independent

variables is based on both statistical and logical relation
ships.

That only three out of the six ROI determinants con

sidered are jointly significant is not surprising, given
22

Marshall Hall and Leonard Weiss, "Firm Size and
Profitability," Review of Economics and Statistics (August,

1967), pp. 319- 33T:
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current understanding of these variables.

As shown by the

partial correlation coefficients, the measures tend to over¬
lap which may result in the explanatory power of the ex¬
cluded variables being stolen by the significant variables.

Test of the Model

The final regression equation which explicitly con¬
siders investment characteristics is used to forecast
ethical drug industry average ROI, and the forecast is then
compared to the industry’s observed rate.

Before doing

this, it seems prudent to test the model by forecasting
ROI for a manufacturing industry other than the drug in¬
dustry.
For several reasons the aerospace industry has been
chosen for this test.

In a recent study, the claim is

made that this industry has an ROI below what is necessary
to compensate investors for the risk involved.

23

Conrad

and Plotkin similarly find that the aerospace industry ex¬
hibits relatively high risk while ROI is near the allO)

manufacturing mean. **

A lower than expected ROI is, of

course, the opposite situation than exists for the ethical
2

^Aerospace Research Center, Aerospace Profits Vs.
Risks (Washington, D.C.: Aerospace Industries Association
of America, 1971).
2^Conrad and Plotkin, ”Risk/Return:
Pattern,” p. 9I4..

U.S.

Industry
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drug industry which is charged with having a rate that is
too high.
Using data for the aerospace industry should indicate
if tiie model is biased.

In light of claims that the in¬

dustry has a rate of return below what would be expected
given the investment characteristics of the industry,

the

model should produce a forecasted ROI above the observed
rate.

The procedure used is first to locate observed all-

manufacturing average ROI and observed aerospace industry
average ROI in Figure I4.Forecast aerospace industry ROI
is then computed by substituting aerospace industry values
for the independent variables into the model which gives a
conditional expectation on ROI.

By exploiting the t dis¬

tribution, the lower boundary of the forecast interval can
be found:

Forecast Interval = Forecast ROI + tS^

where t is the t value at the .01 confidence level and Sf
26
is the forecast error.
Observed aerospace ROI is below both the all-manu¬
facturing industries average ROI and below the lower
boundary of the 99 percent confidence interval forecast
^The aerospace industry is not included in the all¬
manufacturing industries sample in this test.
26

For an explanation of this technique,
berger. Econometric Iheory, pp. 168-171*

see Gold-

H5

$
15
Aerospace Industry - Forecast (13.9$)
A11-Manufacturing - Observed (13.2$)
Aerospace Industry - Forecast Interval
Lower Boundary (12.1$)

Aerospace Industry - Observed (10.3$)

10

ROI

5

0
Fig. l|..—Aerospace industry - forecasted ROI
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from the model; therefore, aerospace industry average rate
of return is indeed less than would be expected after con¬
sideration of the investment characteristics measured by
variance,

skewness, and growth.

This result could occur also because the aerospace
industry is so unique as to not belong in the same regres¬
sion as the all-manufacturing sample.

The Chow Test is

designed to determine if one or more additional sets of
observations belong to the same regression as a previous
set.

27
'

The equation for the test is
Chow Test =

A~B/df
B/df

where A is the error sum of squares of the original set
plus the additional observations and B is the error sum
of squares for just the original set.

Each sum of squares

is adjusted for the respective degrees of freedom (df).
The test is distributed as the F ratio.

Adding the aero¬

space industry observations to the all-manufacturing re¬
gression produces a Chow Test figure of 2.27.

As this is

less than the F value of L|..L|.l at the .01 level of signif¬
icance, it is concluded that the aerospace observations
belong to the same regression as those of the other

2?This test is explained in Gregory C. Chow, "Test
of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear
Regressions," Econometrics (July, I960), pp. 591-60l|..
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manufacturing industries.
Use of the model to forecast aerospace industry rate
of return generates the expected result.

Considering its

level of risk and rate of growth, one would expect the
industry to have a higher ROI than it does.

Taken with

the statistical tests performed, this result reinforces
the conclusion that the regression model is a suitable
device for forecasting ROI for manufacturing industries.

Ethical Drug Industry Rate of Return

Using the same methods and techniques as in the pre¬
vious section, a forecast is made of ethical drug industry
ROI, and the result is compared to the observed rate of
return for the industry.

The hypothesis to be tested is

that ethical drug industry average return on investment is
the same as a11-manufacturing industries average return on
investment after consideration of the characteristics
measured by variance,

skewness, and growth.

The sequence for forecasting drug industry ROI is as
follows:

first, a11-manufacturing average ROI and observed

ethical drug industry average ROI are located in Figure
Ethical drug industry ROI is then forecast by substituting
the industry’s figures for the three independent variables
28

The a11-manufacturing industries sample does not
include the ethical drug industry in this test.

PA
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%

25
Drug Industry - Forecast Interval
Upper boundary (23.3$)
Drug Industry - Observed

(22,2%)

20

ROI

Drug Industry - Forecast (18.0$)

- All-Manufacturing - Observed

(1^,2%)

10

5

0
Pig* 5*—Ethical drug industry--forecasted ROI
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which provides a conditional expectation on ROI.

Finally,

the forecast interval is calculated by use of the t value,
and the upper boundary of the interval located.
A Chow Test is again used to test the hypothesis that
the ethical drug data belong to the same regression as the
a11-manufacturing sample.

The 3*53 test figure allows

acceptance of the hypothesis.
As the drug industry forecast is less than the observed
industry rate, the forecast alone does not account for the
observed industry ROI.

Both observed and forecast ethical

drug industry rates of return are well above the observed
a11-manufacturing rate.

The forecast rate of 18.0 percent

is I4..8 percentage points above the observed all-manufacturing
rate of 13*2 percent which reflects a premium for risk and
growth.

However, the forecast rate is still 1^.2 percentage

points below the observed drug industry rate of 22.2 percent.
A confidence interval must be calculated because the
forecast is based on the regression line which contains
errors as shown by the error term and because the drug
industry data introduced into the equation are a sample
which contains potential errors.

As the question being con¬

sidered is whether drug industry ROI is above what would be
expected given its investment characteristics, only the
upper boundary of the forecast confidence interval is
plotted.
Hie width of the confidence interval reflects the
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lack of precision of the data and of the model as a fore¬
casting device.

Although a more precise model would produce

a narrower confidence interval,

this does not necessarily

imply that the upper boundary of the confidence interval
would be lowered.

A more precise model might generate a

higher forecast rate of return.
Ethical drug industry observed ROI is below the upper
boundary of the forecast interval, and therefore, the hypo¬
thesis is accepted that ethical drug industry average return
on investment is the same as all-manufacturing industries
average return on investment after consideration of the
three investment characteristics.

Alternatively stated,

the excess of observed drug industry ROI can be statis¬
tically explained by variance,

skewness, and growth.

Drug industry ROI is also forecast using the standard
deviation in place of variance as the measure of risk.

The

forecast figure is then 17.86 percent, and the upper boundary
of the forecast interval is 23*59 percent.

These results

show that ethical drug industry risk is not exaggerated by
using variance instead of the standard deviation to measure
risk.
It should be noted that the investment characteristics
included in the model are not measures of market structure.
According to the model, a perfectly competitive industry
might exhibit an average rate of return above the all¬
manufacturing average as the result of high variance,
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positive skewness, and rapid growth.

This is not to suggest

that the ethical drug industry is competitive or monopo¬
listic, only that market structure is not related to the
final model and that drug industry ROI can be explained
without reference to noncompetitive advantages.
These empirical results can be compared to those of
several other studies which have attempted to explain drug
industry ROI.

By holding growth in demand constant. Barges

and Hickey can explain only part of the excess of drug
industry ROI over the all-manufacturing average rate.^
Their results show a 3*9 percentage point growth premium
which leaves an additional 8.1^ percentage point gap of
unexplained rate of return over the 12.9 percent all¬
manufacturing industries rate.

The observed drug industry

rate is 25.2 percent return on assets

(before taxes).

Conrad and Plotkin study risk as a determinant of
ROI.

30

Using regression techniques to hold risk constant,

they also are unable to explain completely drug industry
rate of return.

Their model predicts a rate of approximately

15*0 percent, but the observed drug industry rate is 17.5 per
cent which leaves an unexplained portion of 2.5 percentage
points.

^Alexander Barges and Brian R. Hickey, "Drug Industry
Profits." Financial Analysts Journal (May-June, 19o8),

pp. 75-03.
30

Conrad and Plotkin,
Pattern."

"Risk/Return:

U.S.

Industry
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By jointly considering the effects of two measures of
risk, variance and skewness, along with the effects of growth
in demand, this study statistically explains the excess of
observed drug industry rate of return over a11-manufacturing
ROI.
Summary

This chapter describes the testing of the ROI model
and its use in comparing drug industry ROI to all-manu¬
facturing ROI.

The components of the model are evaluated

by testing the hypothesis of a significant association
between ROI and each of the six ROI determinants.
variance,

For

skewness, and growth the hypothesis is accepted,

but for the determinants measured by R&D intensity, con¬
centration ratio, and firm size, it is rejected as the
latter variables are not statistically significant.

Adver¬

tising and promotional intensity could not be tested for
lack of data.
The final ROI model with variance of return,

skewness

of return, and growth in demand as explanatory variables is
evaluated as a forecasting device using aerospace industry
data.

Forecast industry ROI is slightly above the all¬

manufacturing industries average which agreed with the
a priori prediction.

Considering the results of the statis¬

tical tests along with successfully forecasting aerospace
ROI, it is concluded that the model is a suitable device
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for forecasting rates of return for manufacturing industries.
By explicitly allowing for various possible statistical
errors,

the model is able to explain the ethical drug in¬

dustry’s relatively high rate of return using the deter¬
minants of ROI.

Therefore, the hypothesis is accepted

that ethical drug industry average return on investment is
the same as all-manufacturing industries average return on
investment after consideration of the determinants of ROI.
These empirical results have a variety of useful
implications.

One comes from the unsuccessful attempt to

include as many as six ROI determinants in the same ex¬
planatory equation.

Use of this many variables together

is not successful because the variables are imprecise and
overlap in their association with ROI.

Also, the available

data are less than ideal for use in relating ROI to its
determinants.
The research does result in a model that can be used
to explain ROI for manufacturing industries where risk and
growth are important determinants of ROI.
tics including the F,

Various statis¬

t, and Durbin-Watson tests which are

used to evaluate the model lead to the conclusion that the
model is an acceptable and adequate device for forecasting
manufacturing industries’ rate of return.

The model does

explain the ethical drug industry’s relatively high ROI,
an accomplishment that other models have not achieved.
1
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CHAPTER

VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The ethical drug industry has been extensively
examined with particular attention having been focused on
its relatively high rate of return on investment.

Both

governmental investigators and academic researchers have
attributed the relatively high return on investment to the
noncompetitive structural characteristics exhibited by the
industry.

The existence of product differentiation through

effective advertising of brand-name products, extensive
research activity coupled with the patent privilege, and
the existence of other barriers to competitive entry are
examples of the industry’s structural characteristics.
High relative and absolute rate of return is often cited
as a summary measure for these indications that competition,
at least in the classical sense,

is absent.

The drug industry’s rate of return,

then, has been

used as an indication, if not proof, of anti-competitive
behavior.

However, use of ROI as evidence of noncompetitive

advantages has led to disagreement regarding the definition
of ROI, the determinants of ROI, and the proper method for
making inter-industry ROI comparisons.
Of the various definitions of return on investment,
each of which has its own interpretation,

there is no agreed
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upon form for us© in inter-industry comparisons.

The defi¬

nition used in this study is based on the contention that
in competitive equilibrium net income after taxes to net
worth tends to be equalized.

It was further argued that

an after taxes figure properly reflects the effects of
capital structure as a part of the input mix.
To identify the determinants of ROI, a series of
structural and investment characteristics were studied which
generally have been associated with rate of return.

The

linkage between ROI and the investment characteristics was
derived from the proposition that under competitive con¬
ditions there is a normal rate of return composed of pure
interest plus a premium for relatively high risk and/or
growth in demand.
The hypothesis of a positive association between risk
and rate of return resulted from assuming investors are
risk averse.

In other words,

investors were posited to

require a risk premium as compensation for uncertainty
regarding future receipt of return on investment.
measures of risk were used:

Two

inter-spatial variance and

skewness of the distribution of ROI.
Another investment characteristic, growth in demand,
was hypothesized to be positively associated with rate of
return utilizing the following rationale:

To fulfill

relatively rapid growth in product demand, the firms in
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an industry must increase their share of available capital
supply.

Investors are assumed to demand a growth premium

as compensation for increasing the concentration of their
investment portfolios when they provide the required capital.
Assuming that under noncompetitive conditions firms
can maintain artificially high rates of return, several
structural characteristics were examined as potential ROI
determinants.

Average company size and R&D intensity repre¬

sented measures of possible barriers to entry, and the
concentration ratio, a measure of potential market power.
The structural characteristics were hypothesized to have
a positive relationship with ROI through the implied
linkage of anti-competitive behavior.

Statistical Findings

Regression and correlation techniques were utilized
to test the variables as potential determinants of ROI.
The hypothesized positive association with rate of return
was supported for the two risk measures and for growth in
demand but rejected for each of the structural charac¬
teristics.

A model of return on investment was formulated

based on the arguments presented in Chapters III and IV
and the statistical analysis set forth in Chapter VI.
The three measures of investment characteristics were
combined into a cross-sectional, multiple regression model
of ROI.

Various statistical techniques including t and F

tests and the Durbin-Watson statistic were used to evaluate
the explanatory value of the equation.

In a trial run

using aerospace industry data, the model performed as
expected.

The prediction that aerospace ROI would be

higher after consideration of risk and growth in demand
was confirmed.
Ethical drug industry ROI was studied by introducing
data for the industry into the model to obtain a forecast
of rate of return with variance,
constant.

skewness, and growth held

After adjusting the resulting rate of return

figure for possible forecasting errors, the ethical drug
industry forecast and observed rate of return were com¬
pared.

A Chow Test was used to verify that the drug in¬

dustry data belonged to the same regression as the all¬
manufacturing industries sample data.
Comparing the forecast with the observed rate showed
observed ethical drug industry average ROI to be below the
rate that could result given the particular set of invest¬
ment characteristics exhibited by the drug industry sample.
Therefore, the hypothesis was accepted that ethical drug
industry average return on investment is the same as all¬
manufacturing industries average return on investment
after consideration of investment characteristics.

Conclusions
Ethical drug industry average return on investment is
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significantly higher than a11-manufacturing industries
average ROI before consideration of investment characteris¬
tics.

In fact, the industry's average rate of return is

higher than that of nearly all other manufacturing indus¬
tries.

However, inter-industry comparisons of rates of

return without consideration of the determinants of ROI
are misleading at best, and therefore, explicit attention
must be paid to the determinants.
Return on investment as a performance measure remains
an ambiguous concept.

The implications of various defini¬

tions of ROI are unclear, and there is continued disagree¬
ment regarding which form of the variable is best for use
in inter-industry comparisons.

Consequently, there is need

for additional research regarding the definition and measure¬
ment of ROI.
Of the many possible determinants of ROI suggested by
previous studies, the ones discussed here are the most
important, or at the very least, the most obvious.

Each

of the variables, however, is an imperfect explanatory
variable and has various undesirable characteristics.
A review of the investment characteristics shows one
risk variable, variance of return, can be measured either
spatially or temporally with researchers disagreeing on the
proper method for inter-industry comparisons.

Arguments were

presented explaining the choice of the inter-spatial measure
for this study.

There has been only limited research
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regarding skewness,

the other risk measure.

Review of prior

research coupled with this study’s empirical results leads
to acceptance of the hypothesis that investors desire
positive and dislike negative skewness.

The third invest¬

ment characteristic, growth in demand, was found to have a
positive association with ROI as predicted in both this and
most other studies of growth, but the logical framework for
explaining the relationship requires additional development.
All of the investment characteristics were statistically
significant explanatory variables for rate of return.
Hiere are a variety of possible explanations as to
why none of the structural characteristics had the predicted
positive association with ROI.

For example, the concentra¬

tion ratio is a measure of potential market control which
can lead to artificially high rates of return, but it may
fail to distinguish between industries where this potential
results in anti-competitive behavior and where the potential
goes unexploited.

Also, industries used in the Census

Bureau concentration data may not represent the relevant
product market.

A case in point is the ethical drug industry

which is relatively unconcentrated as a whole but may be
significantly concentrated at the individual product level.
The other structural variables were measures of
possible barriers to competitive entry into an industry.
Although R&D intensity appears to be an important ROI
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determinant, the paucity of data severely limits the
variable's usefulness in empirical research.

Development

of a more extensive data base very likely would result in
researchers finding R&D intensity to be an important ROI
determinant.

Average company size exhibited moderate

collinearity with the other independent variables indicating
it has little independent explanatory value.

It is possible

that size was not significant because data from the Compustat
Tape is mostly for large companies, and consequently,
diversity in size was not present.

At the same time,

the theoretical framework for linking size and ROI is
unclear.

One additional structural characteristic,

advertising intensity, was not included in the statistical
analysis because most of the companies sampled did not
report advertising expense separately.

Prior research has

generally predicted a positive ROl/advertising association,
but empirical results have been ambiguous.
This study clearly demonstrates the difficulties of
formulating a multivariate model of ROI for use in inter¬
industry comparisons.

Although the study successfully

explained ethical drug industry ROI by statistical means,
the need for additional research regarding the definition
of ROI and its determinants as well as the need for better
data were decidedly evident throughout.

The fact that only

three of the seven ROI determinants considered were statis¬
tically significant and included in the final model
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emphasizes the problems of multicollinearity and overlapping
created by relatively imprecise data and variable defini¬
tions.

The conclusion is that future research would be

better directed at refinements in definition and measure¬
ment of the ROI determinants rather than at attempts to
build ROI models containing additional variables.
By considering the individual and joint effects of a
larger number of variables than prior studies, this research
did produce a statistically significant explanatory model
of ROI capable of explaining drug industry ROI.

There

are several possible explanations of why this research was
successful in explaining drug industry ROI where previous
studies have failed.

First, this study utilized data only

for firms primarily engaged in the manufacture of ethical
drug products rather than data for both ethical and pro¬
prietary drug firms as in other research.

Second,

this

study's more recent data may reflect changed economic
relationships, both within the drug industry and between
the drug and other industries, not captured in earlier
data.

Third, the model formulated includes more variables

than prior models.

Also, the definition and measurement

of the variables benefited from research performed in the
interim since previous drug industry studies were completed.
Fourth, explicit consideration was made of possible statis¬
tical errors in both the regression equation and in the
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forecast of drug industry rate of return.

As a model of

ROI, the regression equation is particularly useful in
that it can be used without reference to noncompetitive
structural characteristics.
That ethical drug industry ROI can be explained
statistically without reference to noncompetitive advan¬
tages, however, is far from proof that the industry
operates under competitive conditions.

The results also

do not prove that the industry is uniquely risky.

Even

a conservative view of the findings, though, reveals that
a considerable portion of the excess of industry ROI over
the a11-manufacturing rate is explainable by the invest¬
ment characteristics of the industry.

Ihe extreme reaction

of some to the size of the difference between drug industry
rate of return and that of other manufacturing industries
should be modified by attention to these results.
This study does not and has not sought to answer the
normative question of whether ethical drug industry rate
of return is too high.

Such a question must be answered

by social and political decision-makers.

The goal of this

study was to provide additional knowledge regarding return
on investment in general and about the interpretation of
ethical drug industry rate of return.
Besides its value in explaining drug industry rate
of return, the model can aid decision-making regarding
regulation and control of specific industries.

If an
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industry is identified as having a higher rate of return
than is indicated by its investment characteristics,
regulatory agencies can attempt to force ROI down with
less concern that their actions will result in the with¬
drawal of capital from the industry.

Regulators may decide

not to disturb other industries with relatively high rates
of return which can be explained on the basis of high risk
and/or growth in demand.

Therefore, the model should be a

welcome tool to aid in making predictions of the likely
effects of regulating ROI.
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APPENDIX

I

MEASUREMENT OF RISK

The return on investment model contains two variables
to measure risk:
of ROI.

variance and skewness of the distribution

Variance is measured by the sum of the squared

deviations of individual company rates of return around
their industry mean.

In view of the importance of the

variable for acceptance of the model, this particular
measure of risk deserves additional explanation.
Variance as a risk measure can be stated more pre¬
cisely in equation form.

Using the idea of expected utility

maximization, the following utility function can be written
with I being investment (or wealth) and Y being income, a
random variable:1
U = (Y ♦ I)

ROI will be r = Y/I.

Thus

(1)

(1) may be rewritten as

U = U (rl + I)

(2)

The mathematical exposition follows that in Fred A.
Arditti, "Risk and the Required Return on Equity," Journal
of Finance (March, 1967) » pp. 19-36.
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With E(rl) as the expected value of income, U may be
expanded in a Taylor series about I + E(rl).

Taking ex¬

pected values of both sides of the expansion produces:

E(U) = U[l + E(rl)j

+^0"(I+ Iui)u2 +

(3)

t3

— U!,,(I + Iu^ )u *4- Terms involving higher
3!«
1
^
order moments.
In equation (3), u^, u^, and u^ are the first, second, and
third moments of the probability distribution of ROI.

p

Nothing is said above regarding investor attitude
towards risk.

If risk aversion is assumed, then the in¬

vestor has diminishing marginal utility for additional
Income or wealth.

Mathematically:

U”

(1)^0

(4)

This states that the coefficient of the second moment, U£,
must be negative.

In other words, the greater the vari¬

ability of ROI, the lower the expected value.

This leads

to the hypothesis that there is a positive association be¬
tween variance and ROI.
Different definitions of the second moment can be
used to measure risk, including variance,
2

semi variance,

For a discussion regarding the omission of higher
order moments, see S. C. Tsiang, "The Rationale of the
Mean-Standard Deviation Analysis, Skewness Preference, and
the Demand for Money," American Economic Review (June,
1972), pp. 354-371.
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and standard deviation.

One study that tested these and

other definitions empirically found they were interchange¬
able as risk measures.

Of six definitions, including the

three mentioned above, the study reports:
Die simple correlations among the first four measures
are so high that one measure can be regarded as
essentially a linear transformation of any of the
others.
The simple correlation coefficients in¬
volving the last two measures are less high but are
still high.3
Actually the differences in calculating these dif¬
ferent risk measures are not great.

For example, the semi¬

variance is found in the same way as variance except only
deviations below the mean are considered which reflects
the investors fear of loss.

As semi variance is infre¬

quently used, there is little familiarity with the measure.
The only difference between the standard deviation and
variance is that the latter is in squared units, and there¬
fore, larger deviations are given more weight.^

Under the

assumption of diminishing marginal utility, giving greater
weight to extreme deviations seems logical.

3Bank Administration Institute, Measuring the Invest¬
ment Performance of Pension Funds (Park Ridge, illT:
Aie
Institute,
p. 31^.
^Based on the data used in this study, the standard
deviation is highly correlated with variance (r= .98).
To
evaluate the effects of using squared deviations in cal¬
culating the drug industry*s forecasted rate of return, the
standard deviation was substituted for variance.
The fore¬
casted rate using the standard deviation was not signifi¬
cantly different than the rate calculated using variance.
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A review of the literature reveals that nearly all
researchers utilize either variance or the standard devia¬
tion as the measure of risk.-’

Preference for the standard

deviation or variance seems to be about equal with no
strong theoretical or practical evidence to recommend one
measure over the other.

As variance is a familiar concept

that apparently explains ROI as well as any other definition
of the second moment, it was chosen as the measure to use
in the model.

^A series of articles about risk are reviewed in Chapter
III.
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APPENDIX

II

INDUSTRY DATA
TABLE 8
RATES OP RETURN ON STOCKHOLDERS'

Industry0

INVESTMENT®

Percent
1962 1964 1966 1968 Average

5.2

8.1
12.0 11.0
10.0 8.0

6.8
11.1
8.6

13.6 12.3

14.2
10.5

Meat Products
Dairy Products
Sugar
Candy
Malt Liquor
Distilled Liquor
Fabrics and Yarn
Pulp, Paper and Paperboard
Paperboard Boxes
Periodicals
Petroleum Refineries
Fabricated Rubber Products
Footwear
Glass and Glasswear
Hydraulic Cement
Steel Mills
Iron and Steel Foundries
Non-Ferrous Metals
Machine Tools
Radio and TV Equipment
Motor Vehicle Parts
Aircraft
Shipbuilding
A11-Manufacturing Average

6.1
7.3 9.0
8.2
9.3
9.2 9.3
6.3 14.4
10.5 11.3
8.I4. 10.1
9.1 10.4
11.1 12.9
9.8 8.8
5.3 8.7
6.0 9.0
7.0 8.9
8.6 11.4
10.2 13.4
9.4 11.1
12.1 13.7
6.1
4h? T3T71+

T5TC TS75

TCtf

Ethical k Proprietary Drug

17.1 18.9 21.1 18.8

19.0

Ratio of Drug to All-Mfg.

10.0
8.1
15.1

8.3

2.0

8.5
ix .148.3
15.6
10.1+
6.5

1.8

5.3

11.0 12.1
9.1 7.6
10.5 8.3
10.6 9.2
12.6 9.8
20.1 12.7
12.2 12.4
11.5 11.9

13.1 14.8
14.7 12.0
6.1

8.5
10.0

7.0
8.2
8.1

14.4 10.3
17.0 12.9
19.8 15.0
14.1 12.3
II4..6 13.2
6.210.2

1.8

1.7

7.3
8.8

9.3

10.2
13.4
11.6

10.5
11.9
12.7
7.7
7.7
8.3
7.7
10.2

14.6
11.7

13.4

1.9

®Net Income after Taxes divided by Net Worth - Book Value.
v

Average for 12 largest firms in each industry.
Source:

U.S., Federal Trade Commission, Rates of Return in
Selected Manufacturing Industries (Washington, Deb.:
Government Printing office, l$?0j.
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TABLE 10
INDUSTRIES SAMPLED

Industry
#
iH c\J

2200
2801
2803

7

11

5

Textile Products
Chemicals - Major
Chemicals - Specialty

2835

9

Drugs - Ethical

5
7

Drugs - Proprietary
Cosmetics
Oil - Integrated Domestic
Building Materials - Cement
Primary Smelting & Refining
Machinery - Metal Fabricating
Building Materials - Heat & A/C
Machine Tools
Machinery - Industrial
Office and Business Equipment
Electrical Equipment
Electronics
Aerospace
Engineering, Lab & Research Equip.
Beverages - Brewers
Soap
Shoes
Containers - Metal and Glass
Radio-TV Manufacturers

2912

6

324.1
3331
3400
3430
3540
3560
3570
36IO
3670
3721

k
k

O' O H

2836

t^oO

Number of
Companies

lAvO

SIC
#

2844

c\J f'rk-^‘Vf\>0 f-co O

3811
2082

O rH

2841
3141

cvi

3221

6
6

5

k

10

k

11

5

k

12

k
5
_6

3651
11+5
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Industry Title

Total Companies
Total Companies without
Ethical Drug Industry

TABLE 11
ETHICAL DRUG INDUSTRY SAMPLE

1

Abbott Laboratories

2

Lilly (Ell) & Co.

3

Merck ic Co

4

Pfizer Inc.

5

Sobering - Plough Corporation

6

G. D. Searle & Co.

7

Smith Kline & French Laboratories

8

Syntex Corp.

9

Upjohn Company

.,

Inc.
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See Table 10 for Industry names and SIC numbers
bIndustry 4 is the ethical drug industry.
cData not available.

REGRESSION DATA, 1963-1971
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APPENDIX

III

NET RESIDUALS

In using regression techniques there is always a
question regarding the assumption of linear relationships.
Hiis appendix offers some evidence of the relationships
between ROI and the three independent variables.
Figures 6, 7# and 8 are graphs of the residuals
associated with the final ROI equation.^

Each graph de¬

picts a net relationship between ROI and one independent
variable with the other two independent variables held
constant.

For example, Figure 6 relates ROI and variance

with the mean values for skewness and growth substituted
into the equation.

Hie equation, the coefficient of mul¬

tiple correlation, and the partial correlation coefficient
are all shown on the graph.

These graphs are particularly

useful as evidence of the validity of assuming a linear
relation instead of some more complicated arrangement.

*See Table 10 in Appendix II for the names of the in¬
dustries that correspond to the numbers on the graphs.

il*4

Fig. 6.--Net Residuals—ROI Vs. Variance.
A11-Manufacturing (22 industries
drug industry excluded)

114-5

*30“
2826.6

2kDRUGr

22--

.

#
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xnoustsVI

20,,

0

\~z /—;+

3

t

Skewness
Fig. 7*"-Net Residuals—HOI Vs. Skewness.
All-Manufacturing (22 industries drug industry excluded)
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Pig. 8.--Not Residuals—ROI Vs. Growth.
A11-Manufacturing (22 industries
drug Industry excluded)

llj.7

APPENDIX

IV

THE EXCLUDED VARIABLES
When a regression variable is not significant in a
linear form, there is always a possibility that a dif¬
ferent relationship exists.

The graphs in this appendix

give a visual representation of the association between
ROI and each of the variables excluded from the final
equation because they are not statistically significant.
Each graph shows the plots for the 23 industries,
including the ethical drug industry, along with the least
squares regression line for the a11-manufacturing sample.1
The graphs are used to help ascertain if some more complex
mathematical relation exists between ROI and each of the
excluded variables than the formulation used.

As shown

by the individual plots, no such relationships are
apparent.

See Table 10 in Appendix II for the names of the
Industries that correspond to the numbers on the graphs.
The drug industry is not included in the all-manufacturing
sample•

1J4-8

R&D Intensity

%

of Sales

Fig. 9.--R0I Vs. R&D Intensity.
A11-Manufacturing (17
industries - drug
industry excluded)
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Pig. 10.—ROI Vs. Size (Total Assets).
All-Manufacturing (22
industries - drug industry
excluded)
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)

Fig. 11.—ROI Vs. Size (Log10 Total Assets).
A11-Manufacturing (22 industries drug industry excluded)
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Fig. 12.—ROI Vs. Concentration Ratio (I4.-firm value added).
A11-Manufacturing (22 industries - drug industry
excluded)
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Pig. 13.--ROI Vs. Concentration Ratio (8-firm value added).
All-Manufacturing (22 industries - drug
industry excluded)
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